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THE U.S. WITHDRAWS: IMPACT ON THE U.S. AND
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW
Joseph M Isanga*
The United States has been and will continue to be an important player in
International Law. That role presupposes that the U.S. stays engaged with
International Law. However, in recent years the United States has trended
toward withdrawal from several international treaties and organizations. This
Article argues that it is in the national interest of the United States to adopt a
radically different approach: stay engaged and try to improve International Law
from within. This proposition is predicated on the idea that U.S. withdrawal has
often had the retrogressive effect of loss of leverage for the U.S. and
diminishment of international rule of law. This Article discusses various ways
in which the U.S. government and courts have withdrawn from international law
with a view to recommending ways in which the U.S. can re-engage to better
serve the national interest of the United States, specifically, and international
rule of law, generally. This Article recognizes that to achieve that objective, it
may not be sufficient for the U.S. to simply re-engage with what it views as
being a flawed system. Thus, this Article discusses ways in which international
law can be improved to better support the national interests of the United States.
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INTRODUCTION

The framers of the U.S. Constitution had such serious regard for the
treaties of the U.S. that they put them at the same level as Federal Law,
as supreme law of the land.1 The national interests of the United States,
as they relate to treaties, are so great that the power to make treaties was
* Visiting Professor of Law, Southern University Law Center, LL. B (First Class, Honors)
(Makerere University, Uganda), LL.M (summa cum laude) (University of Notre Dame, USA),
J.S.D. (summa cum laude) (University of Notre Dame). Thanks are owed to my research assistants
Patrecia Ming, Stephanie Giagnorio and Madison Allen.
1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; See also THEFEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton)
(maintaining that "[t]he treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered

as part of the law of the land.").
215
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not to be reposited solely in the executive branch. Alexander Hamilton
wrote:
However proper or safe it may be in governments where
the executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit
to him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly
unsafe and improper to intrust that power to an elective
magistrate of four years' duration... . But a man raised from
the station of a private citizen to the rank of chief
magistrate . .. might sometimes be under temptations to
sacrifice his duty to his interest ... An avaricious man might
be tempted to betray the interests of the state to the
acquisition of wealth. An ambitious man might make his
own aggrandizement, by the aid of a foreign power, the price
of his treachery to his constituents. The history of human
conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human
virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit
interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those
which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to
the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced
2
as would be a President of the United States.
If the executive branch could not act unilaterally in the making of
treaties due to the national interests of the United States that might be at
stake, it seems appropriate that the same logic should apply to withdrawal
from those treaties. Moreover, when the U.S. withdraws from an
international treaty, it is not just its national interest that is at stake. It can
3
come with "deep costs to the stability of our world order," which
international rule of law helps to maintain. While it is permissible under
international law to withdraw from treaties, 4 the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties provides that a fundamental tenet of international law
5
is that treaties must be fulfilled in good faith. The stability of
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
3. Jean Galbraith, The President's Power to Withdraw the United States from
InternationalAgreements at Present and in the Future, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 445, 445

(2017).
4. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 42(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT] (providing that "[t]he termination of a
treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party, may take place only as a result of the
application of the provisions of the treaty or of the present Convention.").

5. Id. art. 26 (providing that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith."). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is
regarded by the U.S. Department of State as largely an embodiment of customary international
law. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm

[https://perma.cc/A8HG-FKGT] (last visited Aug. 26,

2019) (stating that "[t]he United States considers many of the provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the law of
treaties," without specific mention of which provisions constitute customary international law.).
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international order is predicated on the maintenance of international rule
of law. That is because among the core elements of international rule of
law are predictability and stability. 6
This Article argues that the pace at which the United States has exited
international treaties, even while promising to rejoin those treatieswhich has not yet happened-threatens both the critical interests of the
United States as well as threatening international rule of law. It proposes
that the legislative branch of United States government needs to play a
more proactive role in making treaties by specifically providing and
implementing legislations that the United States shall not exit certain
treaties without the consent of Congress. More generally, it proposes that
the judicial branch would also need to adopt a posture that supports
international obligations of the United States. This Article also proposes
that multilateral institutions need to pay more attention to interests of the
United States if there are legitimate reasons for concern. 7
While the exercise of democracy in all countries can have inevitable
political consequences 8 domestically and internationally as well, as it'
relates to international relations there needs to be, at a minimum, a core
of stable and continuing international norms, regardless of such internal
changes, to assure predictability and stability of international norms in a
multi-polar world. When that does not happen, the rest of the world is at
the mercy of the vicissitudes of political change, with the possibility of
irreversible and permanent damage to international rule of law. 9
More recently, the dialectic between a more globalist approach versus
an emphasis on a nationalist agenda, has seemed diametrically and
irredeemably irreconcilable and it has had repercussions for whether or
not the United States can or should remain party to some treaties. This
6. Arthur Watts, The InternationalRule ofLaw, 36

GERMAN

Y.B. INT'L L. 15, 28 (1993)

(observing that "An important consequence of certainty of the law is that the outcome of reliance
upon the law is to a large degree predictable, which it cannot be if the law is uncertain (or if
arbitrary power is not excluded). This in turn is an important factor in establishing confidence in

the law, and also in encouraging that stability in the affairs of the community which it is part of
the function of the rule of law to create.").
7. This Article will focus on institutions like the International Criminal Court.
8. See Jack Goldsmith, The Trump Administrationand InternationalLaw, Recent Books
on InternationalLaw: Book Reviews, 113 AM. J. INT'L L. 408, 414 (2019) (observing that Obama
and Bush administrations charted different courses for international law and that these
"presidencies were ultimately quite consequential, and both shaped and violated international

law").
9. Harold Hongju Koh, The Trump Administrationand InternationalLaw, 56 WASHBURN
L. J. 413, 414 (2017), https://contentdm.washburnlaw.edu/digital/api/collection/wlj/id/6754/
page/0/inline/wlj_6754_0 [https://perma.cc/28CN-Y778] (wondering "whether the Trump
Administration's many initiatives will permanently change the nature of America's relationship
with international law and its institutions," notwithstanding the fact that "laws be faithfully
executed, including certain rules of international law, which as ratified treaty or customary
international law comprise part of the law of the United States").
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Article is premised on the proposition that interests of the United States
can be reconciled with robust international engagement. The United
States did not achieve its success in the past by stepping outside the
currents of international cooperation.1 0 This subject is important because
it can have real impact on whether the United States can act in concert
with other nations on a number of issues that cut across borders-from
pandemics to global recession or climate issues.
Professor Jack Goldsmith aptly noted, "U.S. stance toward the Paris
Agreement on climate change, international trade laws, and the Iran
nuclear deal...implicate international law" and concluded that "[m]ost
11
observers think [that the U.S.] . .. is wreaking havoc in these areas." To
support his conclusion, Professor Goldsmith points to the fact that the
U.S. announced that it would withdraw from
[A]t least six international agreements, including a major
arms control agreement . .. two signature agreements (Paris
and Iran) . . . [and] has refused to conclude, or stopped
negotiating over, two important international trade
[and] has upended the international trade
agreements ...
system and publicly trashed the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, the G7, the G20, the United Nations, and most
of the United States' traditional allies... [and] has withdrawn
from two important human rights bodies, reversed the
United States' historic position on human rights leadership,
taken an aggressive initiative against the International
Criminal Court, stopped cooperating with human rights
rapporteurs, and possibly violated international law.12
Additionally, United States announced its withdrawal from major
4
treaties," international trade and environmental law platforms,' among

10. See The Obama Administration National Security Strategy 9, 12 (May 2010),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/nationalsecurity _strategy.p

df [https://perma.cc/2FFN-8UJD].
11. Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 410.
12. Id. at 415.

13. The U.S. President announced that the U.S. government would withdraw from the 2015
Paris Agreement on Climate Change as well as Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
related to Iran's nuclear program. See STEVEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44761,
WITHDRAWAL FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE PARIS AGREEMENT,
AND THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44761.pdf

[https://perma.cc/66B2-MK26].
14. valerie Volcovici, U.S. Submits FormalNotice of Withdrawalfrom ParisClimate Pact,
REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usa-paris/u-s-submits-

formal-notice-of-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-pact-idUSKBN1AK2FM
T9-Y44G].
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others.1 5
While there may be legitimate concerns as to whether those treaties
are in the interest of the United States, whether and when more perfect
agreements can be negotiated after the less perfect ones are exited is not
always assured. In the meantime, the United States may be left isolated
and in a position of inability-short of use of unilateral force-to
determine the course of international issues, as the case of the U.S.
ceasing to a participant in the Iran Nuclear Deal exemplifies.' 6 If the
United States cannot participate in international discussions regarding
whether to reimpose economic sanctions on Iran, the national security
interests are at stake, and yet the U.S. does not have a seat at the table
because it withdrew from the deal.' 7
More generally, international rule of law is at a crossroads because
when the only superpower exits international law, there is "enormous
change to international law."1 8 This is because international law mostly

15. The counterargument that can be made is that competitors of the United States, such as
China and Russia, have refrained from joining certain international treaties and there is no reason
to hold the U.S. to a higher standard when embracing such a standard would run counter to the
national interest of the United States. That may very well be the case, at least in the short term.
However, two wrongs do not make a right and it is unlikely that regimes that have little regard for
international law will be able to avoid having to abide by international rules in the long term.
There are several reasons for that. First, in a world order defined by nation states, the only way
for nations to interact meaningfully is through international norms. It is for this reason that
"[p]articularly since the latter part of the nineteenth century, the efforts of diplomats and states to
establish clear norms for the conduct of international relations . .. have been remarkably
successful." Paul H. Kreisberg, Does the U.S. Government Think That International Law Is

Important, 1 1

YALE J.

INT'L L. 479, 479 (1986). Secondly, there are other dimensions for which

international law remains important such as "[c]risis management, high-stakes political and
economic conflict, and national security policy" because these areas "attract[] constant and visible
attention from senior decisionmakers." Id. at 479. Third, the enduring importance that the United
States still attaches to international law is visible in the fact that its ambassador to the United
Nations is a member of the Cabinet. Fourth, "[w]hether or not international law plays a direct and
immediate role in decision-making by any particular U.S. administration, it is often of such
importance to other governments that U.S. officials are compelled to take it into account in
explaining and justifying their actions." Id. at 483. Finally, the fact that technological, social,
economic advances have remarkably and irreversibly brought the world closer than could ever be
imagined only means that nations have greater reasons to collaborate in establishing norms that
ensure meaningful interaction of nations in those areas.
16. Iran argued that the United States lacked standing to participate in deliberations
concerning the Iran Nuclear Deal. See Lara Jakes & David E. Sanger, Instead of Isolating Iran,
U.S. Finds Itself on the Outside Over Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html?auth=login-google
[https://perma.cc/TN9Z-GRCW].

17. Id.
18. Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 415.
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works by reciprocity 19 and so it is possible that other nations' respect for
or willingness to abide by international norms in good faith falters,
following the lead of the United States. Historically, the United States has
20
been a trailblazer, champion of, and powerful actor in international law,
setting the example for many other nations. To underscore its importance
to the United States, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Gray stated in Paquet
Habana, "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination." 2 1
The significance of international law is also evidenced by the fact that
over the years, the U.S. has signed and ratified more than 10,000
2
international multilateral and bilateral treaties, 2 and the fact that it was a
founding member and promoter of the United Nations in San Francisco
23
in 1945 and continues to be an important member of the United Nations.
The U.S. Department of State acknowledges those historical facts:
Once World War II began, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt determined that U.S. leadership was essential for
19. See, e.g., David J. Lynch, Taylor Telford, Damian Paletta & Gerry Shih, U.S. Prepares

To Slap Tariffs On RemainingChinese Imports, Which CouldAdd Levies On Roughly $300 Billion
In Additional Goods, WASH. POST (May 13, 2019, 6:34 PM) https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/2019/05/13/trump-warns-china-not-retal ate-tariffs-insists-they-wont-hurt-us-consumers/

[https://perma.cc/UX7B-8AV8]. A short economic analysis of international trade, tariffs, and
wealth/waste generation is provided below:
Despite the simplicity of the comparative advantage argument, we often see laws

and regulations that ignore this principle. Consider, for example, the many tariffs
and quotas placed on goods traded internationally. The law of comparative
advantage is often used to explain the benefits of international trade. Resources
are used most effectively when they are moved to their most highly valued use.
By definition, this means putting resources in their lowest marginal opportunity
cost use relative to other resources available for pro-duction. Countries that

ignore this logic by enacting tariffs and quotas will become overly self-sufficient
and therefore waste resources. The more mutually beneficial transactions that a
society undertakes, the more wealth it creates. International trade is based on
mutually beneficial exchange. Tariffs and quotas increase the costs of
international trade and, thus, decrease the quantity of mutually beneficial
transactions and deter wealth creating transactions.
HENRY N. BUTLER ET AL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 75 (3d ed. 2014).

20. Koh, supra note 9, at 415 (observing that "[t]he United States of America--and its
President in particular--are powerful players in the making and unmaking of international law.").

21. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
22. See MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY

219 (5th ed. 2014).
23. The UnitedStates and the Foundingof the United Nations, August 1941 - October1945,
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUB. AFFS., https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/

55407.htm [https://perma.cc/RZ6R-EPC5] (last visited on Aug. 9, 2018).
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the creation of another international organization aimed at
preserving peace, and his administration engaged in
international diplomacy in pursuit of that goal. He also
worked to build domestic support for the concept of the
United Nations. After Roosevelt's death, President Harry S
Truman also assumed the important task of maintaining
support for the United Nations and worked through
complicated international problems, particularly with the
Soviet Union, to make the founding of the new organization
possible. After nearly four years of planning, the
international community finally established the United
Nations in the spring of 1945.24
Yet, in recent years, the United States appears to have backtracked
from the position it had historically once held. The U.S. withdrew from
important agencies of the United Nations such as the United Nations
Human Rights Council, 2 5 UNESCO, 2 6 and the World Health
Organization. 2 7 The United States might counterargue that it is not
disengaging from international law to the detriment of its national
interest. Instead, the United States may maintain that it is only tactfully
withdrawing in order to re-engage once the international community
makes changes that are in the interest of the United States.
In the meantime, the United States may insist that it is not worse off
because it can pursue bilateral accords, one country at a time and, if
necessary, act unilaterally in pursuit of its national interest. While there
is something to be said for bilateral accords and the ability to act
unilaterally, there are important limits to those approaches. While global
institutions and the multilateral treaties are not without reproach, 2 8
24. Id.
25. US Quits 'biased' UN

Human Rights Council, BBC

NEWS

(June 20, 2018),

https://www.bbc.com/news/44537372 [https://perma.cc/7YNZ-BJ3M].

26. Eli Rosenberg & Carol Morello, U.S. Withdraws from UNESCO, the U.N.'s Cultural
Organization, Citing Anti-Israel Bias, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2017, 5:10 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/10/12/u-s-withdraws-from-unescothe-u-n-s-cultural-organization-citing-anti-israel-bias/ [https://perma.cc/6SBE-6BQW].
27. Jason Hoffman & Maegan Vazquez, Trump Announces End of US Relationship With
World Health Organization, CNN POLITICS (May 29, 2020, 7:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/05/29/politics/donald-trump-world-health-organization/index.html
[https://perma.cc/LV5

K-DCD3].
28. E.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Multilateralismand Its Discontents, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 393, 395
(2000) (Alvarez observes that "[t]he UN collective security system, designed in the wake of the
Holocaust, has prevented neither intrastate disputes nor repeated mass atrocities" and "[i]n the
economic realm, free trade/free market forces (including their institutionalized components such
as the WTO, NAFTA, and the international financial institutions) have reinforced ethnic self-

identification while failing to ameliorate either the gap between rich and poor nations or the gap
between rich and poor within nations."). It is therefore unsurprising that there have been efforts
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29
unilateralism and bilateralism appear to have more costs than benefits,
which can exacerbate withdrawal from several international compacts
and platforms. 3 0 Moreover, not many countries have accepted offers for
bilateral treaties with the United States.'

to find alternatives to globalist approaches. Such alternatives include "transnational networks of
domestic actors, both governmental and private (such as central bankers, parliamentarians,
insurance brokers or shippers) .... " Id. at 397. Yet, there are some issues that only a more global
and multilateral approach can resolve. See, e.g., Jon Stone, EUPutsIreland'sCommissioner Who
Called Boris Johnson 'Unelected' In Charge OfNegotiating Trade Deal With UK, INDEPENDENT
(Sept.

11, 2019), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-bois-johnson-

ireland-eu-commissioner-trade-deal-uk-a9098821.html [https://perna.cc/FZ 5K-HGK6] (European
Union trade commissioner Phil Hogan observing that after Britain exiting the European Union
(EU), it would become a "'medium-sized' nation with reduced bargaining power," and that after
it exits the EU Britain would "regain the sovereignty to seek and strike agreements where it wants

but with reduced bargaining power, reduced security of its markets and supply chains, and a
friction and cost added to each trade shipment to the EU, its biggest trade partner."). Some crossborder problems require an international or multilateral approach, which is why such institutions
need to be strengthened and not further weakened by fierce criticism focused on their perceived
inefficiencies. For example, "it is undeniable that giving effect to human rights requires at least
some international scrutiny since governments guilty of human rights violations are not likely to

police themselves," the maintenance of international peace and security and the fight against
pandemics in many instances require a global approach. See id. at 399. Moreover, because of the
threat of tit-for-tat responses from other nations, unilateral approaches are likely to have limited
success. It has been noted that "when the U.S. acts unilaterally or in ways that other states see as
violating critical standards of international behavior, American policies often fail or succeed only
partially." Kreisberg, supra note 15, at 484.
29. See JANIS & NOYES, supra note 22, at 774. The controversial 2003 U.S. military
intervention in Iraq without unambiguous U.N. Security Council authorization-even though the

U.S. was joined by some allies-is widely viewed as an example of the danger and limits of
unilateralism, a repeat of which the United States has tried to avoid. In that case, the United States
justified the decision to use force in Iraq on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, read in
conjunction with U.N. Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687. See JANis & NOYES, supra note
22, at 774. But the legitimacy of that intervention was marred by the controversy over whether
the U.S. should have sought express U.N. Security Council authorization for the use of force

because Resolution 1441 merely recalled Resolutions 678 and 687-which explicitly granted
authority to use force against Iraq following its invasion and annexation Kuwait-but it did not

expressly authorize the use of force per se in Iraq.
30. See, e.g., Katie Rogers, Trump Pulls Out of Arms Treaty During Speech at N.RA.
Convention, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/us/politics/

trump-national-rifle-association.html [https://perma cc/GPA6-PZEW] (On April 26, 2019, the
U.S. President declared that the U.S. was withdrawing from an international arms treaty.). See
also, Nicole Gauette, Ryan Browne, & Vivian Salama, Trump Confirms US is WithdrawingFrom
Another Major Arms Treaty, CNN POLriCS (May 21, 2020, 6:15 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/05/21/politics/us-open-skies-arms-control-treaty/index.html [https://permacc/45TW-GDYK]
(Reporting that "President Donald Trump confirmed the U.S. will be exiting the Open Skies

Treaty, a pact designed to reduce the risk of military miscalculations that could lead to war.").
31. John Wagner & David J. Lynch, Trump SaidHe Would Strike One-on-One Trade Deals.
That's Not Happening., WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/

trump-said-he-would-stke-one-on-one-trade-deals-thats-not-happening/2017/11/1 4/eced8a4e-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss2/3
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It could be argued that the United States can act unilaterally, if other
countries don't yield to its national interest, even though reality doesn't
support such a belief. 32 This position assumes that other countries,
particularly America's allies, will be more indulgent of its actions, but,
as Ambassador Taft explained, the United States has not acted in this
way, and it is a well-accepted thought "that one of the reasons that the
United States is where it is today is because over the past century the
United States has been in the forefront of making international
agreements," 33 not acting unilaterally.
With regard to bilateralism, addressing certain issues that pertain to
two countries such as trade investment, bilateral agreements are the best
devices to use. For a bilateral treaty, the negotiation time is fairly short,
as it is only necessary for two states to meet and agree on the details of
the treaty. Unlike multilateral agreements, parties can agree on every
provision in the agreement and there is no need to make reservations.
Some countries may refuse to join the agreement because of
objectionable provisions. Even then, nations enter into multilateral
agreements because they appear to have more advantages relative to
bilateral agreements. In this regard, it has been noted that:
One obvious advantage with multilateral arrangements is
reduced negotiation costs. Once a multilateral negotiation
has been concluded, the results apply to all and there is no
need to duplicate the cost of bargaining with many
individual countries. Monitoring and enforcement costs are
also reduced, since the same standards apply to all, instead
of a myriad of different standards applying between each
bilateral partner. Further, if all are subject to the same
minimum standards, there is no potential for 'free- riding'
giving rise to the classical problem of the 'prisoner's
dilemma.' 34

c949-11e7-b0cf-7689a9f2d84e story.html [https://perma.cc/9JA7-4L6S] (reporting, "[a]s he
traveled across Asia, President Trump touted a flurry of multibillion-dollar military sales and oneoff business deals with nations he visited. Upon his return to the White House this week, he is
pledging to unveil more, boasting that his handiwork is "far bigger than anything you know." But
the 12-day trip also underscored how little progress Trump has made on a far more sweeping
pledge central to his "America first" vision: replacing multilateral trade agreements-which he
has long railed against but every U.S. president since Harry S. Truman has embraced-with oneon-one deals more "fair" to the United States.").
32. See Koh, supra note 9, at 420 (observing that "the basic message ... is that no single
player in the transnational legal process-not even the most powerful one-can easily discard the
rules that we have been following for some time.").
33. Christopher J. Borgen, Presidential Panel: The Impact of The United States on
InternationalLaw, 96 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 162, 164 (2002).
34. Vicki Waye, Assessing Multilateral vs. Bilateral Agreements and Geographic
Indicationsthrough InternationalFood and Wine, 14 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L. J. 56, 63 (2005).
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There is no doubt that international treaties would need to be changed
in some respects in order to protect the national interest of the United
States. For example, there is something to be said for the United States
argument that the trade deficits with China have an impact on its national
interest and those deficits may be due, in part, to exemptions that China
has benefited from pursuant to its designation as a developing nation
35
under the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime. Because the WTO
treaties are not going to be renegotiated quickly, China can continue to
exploit its deficiency for a very long time, unless the United States takes
decisive and immediate action. 36
With that said, it seems that while the United States has legitimate
concerns, there would be no international law without tradeoffs because
every country has its national interest. In light of that reality, the U.S.
may never achieve the desired changes through retreat from international
law and commitments, especially when replacement treaties are not likely
to be adopted at the behest of unilateral withdrawals. Withdrawal is
allowed under international law, but large-scale withdrawals appear to
strike at the core of international rule of law because there is the
expectation that treaties will be performed in good faith, otherwise there
is no security to any international compact if large scale withdrawals is
the norm. 37
It is not just withdrawal from treaties that has the potential to
negatively impact U.S. national interest and international rule of law,
there is also the consistent trend of not joining many treaties as observed

35. See, e.g., Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/devl_e.htm

[https://perma.cc/T5LM-EUPD]

(last visited May 12, 2021) (explaining that after a country has designated itself a "developing
country," it is not immediately subject to several commitments under WTO agreements;

"developing countries" have greater market access and are not subject to anti-dumping
regulations, animal, plant and technical standards.).
36. See, e.g., Jim Zarroli, Trump Pledges To Withdraw From U.S.-South Korea Trade
Agreement, NAT'L PuB. RADIO (NPR) (Sept. 6, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/
06/548985192/trump-pledges-to-withdraw-from-u-s-south-korea-trade-agreement [https://perma

.cc/S4HK-HECS] (reporting that the U.S. President said, "The fact is that the United States has
trade deficits with many, many countries, and we cannot allow that to continue. And we'll start

with South Korea right now.").
37. VCLT, supra note 4, art. 26. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reiterates

that "every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith." Id The European Union expressed concern that the U.S. strategy would "undercut
European solidarity in NATO and the European Union so the United States can exercise its
economic and military power to shape relations with individual countries, just as China and Russia

seek to do" and according to Frangois Heisbourg, a French political analyst, "Europeans realize
that... he [the U.S. President] wants to dismantle the multilateral order created 70 years ago that
/

he believes limits American power." Steven Erlanger, Amid the Trumpian Chaos, Europe Sees a
7
8
Strategy: Divide and Conquer, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/201 /0
13/world/europe/trump-europe.html [https://perma.cc/G9D7-CGNU].
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by Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith. 38 The United States is not a state
party to several important treaties such as the Convention on the Rights
of the Child,39 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 40 Land Mines
Convention, 4 1 Kyoto Protocol, 42 and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. 43
Moreover, United States courts have not consistently supported
international law which, again, detracts from the obligation to perform
international treaties in good faith. International law is, for the most part,
enforced within domestic courts and thus domestic courts play a crucial
role in the promotion of international rule of law.44
In light of the above, Part II of this Article discusses the impact of the
executive branch's approach to international law. Part III discusses recent
jurisprudence of U.S. courts that has overall trended towards a more
restrictive approach to international law. Because there can be legitimate
concerns as to whether international law or international courts always
act in the interest of the United States, Part IV revisits the basics of
international law in order to assess whether international law needs to do
more to support the national interests of the United States. Part V makes
recommendations and provides the conclusion.

38. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, PresidentialControl over InternationalLaw,

131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1211 (2018) (noting the "reduction internationally in the number of
multilateral treaties").

39. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Sept. 2, 1990), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=IV-1I &chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/DX82-GKL6].
40. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsll.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=XX1-6&chapter=21
&Temp-mtdsg3&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/Z6JU-HGU3].
41. United Nations Convention on Land Mines, available at https://www.un.org/en/
genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.44_convention%20antipersonnel%20mines
.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUX6-E26C] (last visited May 12, 2021).
42. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsgno=XXVII-7-a&chapter-27&clang= en [https://perma.cc/7K97-32FA].
43. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3,

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%2OIl/ChapterO/20XVI

II/XVIII-10.en.pdf

[https://perma.cc/A7R9-MWR8].
44. For the most part, International Law relies upon domestic courts for enforcement. For
example, between 1946 and 2000 International Court of Justice handled about 70 cases. See Karen

Mingst, InternationalCourt ofJustice, ENCYCLOPEDIA

BRITANNICA,

https://www.britannica.com/

topic/International-Court-of-Justice [https://perma.cc/FT5V-NE57] (last visited on Jan. 3, 2020);
see also American International Law Cases, Fourth Series: 2006 - Present, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://global.oup.com/academic/product/american-international-law-casesfourth-series-9780190875015?lang=en&cc=us# [https://permacc/JL5J-DKS3] (last visited on
Jan. 3, 2020) (Oxford University Press has an annual reporter series that compiles approximately
300 cases decided by U.S. courts issuing opinions involving international law related issues over
twelve volumes.).
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I. RECENT EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW

The United States has had a long-running love-hate relationship with
international law in general and international organizations and their
agencies, as well. 4 5 Historically, the United States has been the harbinger
of norms that were developed for the first time in its domestic crucible
46
and were subsequently internationalized for all, human rights being just
45. Alvarez, supra note 28, at 405-06. One way the United States can have a dramatic
impact on international rule of law is to withhold its financial contributions to multilateral
institutions, such as the United Nations, or attach conditions to such contributions, unless they
change the way they conduct business in relation to the United States. Id. This is an effective

bargaining tool because withholding the funds denies such organizations vital funding that they
need to survive. Id. The United States is the largest single contributor to the U.N. financial system.
See, e.g., Amanda Shendruk, Laura Hillard & Diana Roy, Funding the United Nations: What
Impact Do U.S. ContributionsHave on UNAgencies and Programs?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.
(June 8, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/article/funding-united-nations-what-impact-do-uscontributions-have-un-agencies-and-programs [https://perma.cc/44AL-NJXV] (the United States

contributed more than $10 billion in 2018, roughly one fifth of the United Nations' collective
budget). Furthermore, recently the United States has on many occasions implemented this policy

of refusing or withholding its contributions. See id. (noting that the U.S. has raised complaints
about the amount that it contributes in the past and that if the United States followed through on

proposed cuts, then the United Nations would be significantly impacted along with it its ability to
carry out its objectives); John Fritze & Deirdre Shesgreen, Pay freeze at the UN? Trump
administration owes the United Nations $1 Billion, USA TODAY (Oct. 9, 2019, 3:15 PM),
2
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/ 019/10/09/donald-trump-dismisses-united-nations-

deficits-says-others-should-pay/3917554002/

[https://perma.cc/8UT8-EEYQ] (reporting that the

U.S. President questioned the value of the United Nations and told the multinational organization

that "[t]he future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots," and that "[t]he
future belongs to sovereign and independent nations."). Josd E. Alvarez has argued that this
practice of withholding or conditioning contributions is "unilateralism that attempts, with some
success, to turn a multilateral forum intended to voice the views and needs of all into a branch
office of the U.S. Department of State." Alvarez, supra note 28, at 407. Indeed, it has not always

been this way. In 1962, the United States indicated in its brief to the International Court of Justice
in the Certain Expenses case that each nation has a legal duty to pay its assessed contribution to

the United Nations. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. Pleadings 180 (Jan. 22,
9
1962), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/4 /1781.pdf [https://perma .cc/HNG7EV4N]; see also Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July
49 49
/0 -19620720-ADV-01-00https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/
1962),
20,
EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/9STY-BD5Z].
46. However, the human rights record of the United States remains a mixed one. See Doug
Cassel, The United States and Human Rights Treaties: Can We Meet Our Commitments, 41 HuM.

RTS. 5, 5 (2015) (noting that while "[t]he United States has a strong human rights record in many
respects.... [c]ompared to other countries ... there is another side to the story.. . . [T]he CIA
and military [have] tortured prisoners, but few prosecutions or civil damages judgments resulted.
The United States continues to detain prisoners indefinitely without trial, and few are released on

habeas corpus.

...

[and] engage in questionable killings by unmanned drones and intrusive and

expansive NSA surveillance. Racial minorities suffer police violence and disproportionate rates
of incarceration in substandard facilities. Many Native Americans live in abominable
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one instance of that. The United States-arguably the most successful
federalized polity in the world which makes it a "world" in microcosm
was uniquely positioned for experimentation on various norms that would
later be internationalized.
At the same time, the United States remained a discrete nation-state
on the global stage that had national interests to assert against other
countries. Whenever those interests clashed with those of other countries,
the tendency was to assert a more nationalistic stance versus other
nations. The epidemy of that tendency is American exceptionalism. In
more recent parlance, that position amounts to "America First." 4 7 It is a
worldview that holds that "the United States should act based on its
perceived national interests, not international rules."4 8 But it is not as if
that objective can only be achieved through that paradigm. Put
differently, the national interests of the United States are not
diametrically irreconcilable with the pursuit of a more collaborative
paradigm. It is possible to imagine a world in which U.S. national
interests can be protected while the United States is working in
collaboration with other countries, because the United States is at its best
when it leads rather than when it retreats from the international stage.49
The "making friends" strategy is perceived to be the best way to
garner international support for the United States' interests both
domestically and abroad. 50 International law recognizes and supports the
notion of nation-states and it is not premised on the suppression of
national interest. The founding principle of the Charter of the United
Nations is national sovereignty.51 Thus, the idea that international law, or
international organizations for that matter, are irreconcilable with the
pursuit of national interest is a misrepresentation. It is urgent to
emphasize the significance of international law and institutions at this
time because, while opposition to international law and institutions is
conditions .... [American] laws do not treat economic, social, and cultural rights as human

rights.").
47. Catherine Amirfar & Ashika Singh, The Trump Administration and the Unmaking of

InternationalAgreements, 59 HARV.

INT'L L.

J. 443, 443 (2018).

48. Koh, supra note 9, at 420.
49. See Amirfar & Singh, supra note 47, at 443 (arguing that, far from being harmful,
international "commitments long have served U.S. national interests").
50. In general, the U.S. Administration's approach during the Obama era can be summed
up by the following four principles: (1) principled engagement; (2) diplomacy as a critical element
of smart power; (3) strategic multilateralism; and (4) the notion that following universal standards,
not double standards, and following rules of domestic and international law, as well as living by
our values makes us stronger and safer. See Harold Hongju Koh, U.S. Dep't of State Legal
Adviser, Address Before the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar.
25, 2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/39119.htm [https://perma.cc /K77Z-

SXMQ].
51. U.N. Charter art. 2,

¶ 1 (The

United Nations Charter proclaims that the United Nations

"Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.").
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nothing new, what used to be at the periphery appears to be going
52
mainstream and threatening the very core of international rule of law.
There is overwhelming evidence that the animus towards international
law is real and needs to be taken seriously.53
Assuming, arguendo, that what is said about international law and
institutions is true, what are the chances that national interest can be
realistically achieved at the expense of other nations? International law is
enforced on the basis of the principle of reciprocity5 4 and so the United
States might not be successful in asserting its interest while the rest of the
world sits by and does not push back. It has been noted that,
[T]here is a practical reason for the United States to abide
by its international legal obligations: reciprocity. It is in our
own national interest to treat international legal obligations
52. See Amirfar & Singh, supra note 47, at 443 (observing that the "America First"
"platform has since manifested in part as skepticism of, if not outright hostility to, the rules-based,
interconnected international order that the United States had played a central role in painstakingly
constructing since World War II").

53. See, e.g., Donald Trump, U.S. President, Statement by President Trump on the Paris
Climate Accord (June

1, 2017), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/

statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/
President proclaiming that "[a]s President,

I

[https://perma.cc/Q5K7-W8X6]

(the

U.S.

can put no other consideration before the wellbeing

of American citizens. The Paris Climate Accord is simply the latest example of Washington
entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other
countries."). It is unlikely that the Paris Accord was made to the exclusive benefit of the other
countries. But what this statement reflects is that there is nothing good in this particular treaty for
the United States and thus there is no reason to participate in it. It is instructive that other

developed countries have remained in the accord despite the U.S. position. While withdrawing
the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or "JCPOA"), the
U.S. President described the deal in the following terms: the "so-called "Iran deal" was supposed
to protect the United States and our allies from the lunacy of an Iranian nuclear bomb," but instead,
it was a "disastrous deal [that] gave [the Iranian] regime-and it's a regime of great terror-many
billions of dollars, some of it in actual cash .. . this was a horrible, one-sided deal that should have

never, ever been made." Donald Trump, U.S. President, Remarks by President Trump on the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (May 8, 2018), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/

[https://perma

.cc/F5S5-6B6D]. The U.S. President ended by announcing that "[i]n light of these glaring flaws,
I announced last October that the Iran deal must either be renegotiated or terminated." Id. It is
instructive that none of the other developed countries have so far joined the United States in

exiting the Iran Deal. Meanwhile, none of the promised renegotiation of the treaty has taken place
and U.S.-Iran relations tensions only exacerbated when the U.S. ordered the unilateral use of force

on Iran's top military commander Qasem Soleimani. See Donald Trump, U.S. President, Remarks
by President Trump on the Killing of Qasem Soleimani (Jan. 3, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.
archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-killing-qasem-soleimani/

[https://

perma.cc/2ZXU-JERK] (the U.S. President announcing that "[l]ast night, at my direction, the
United States military successfully executed a flawless precision strike that killed the number-one
terrorist anywhere in the world, Qasem Soleimani.").
54. See generallyJohn W. Head, The United States and InternationalLaw After September
11, 11 KAN. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 1 (2001-2002).
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as binding on us so that we can continue to expect other
states to take their own international legal obligations
seriously.... If we disregard .. . our treaty commitments
. . . then we cannot easily press other states to honor their
own treaty commitments.5 5

Examples of reciprocity in action and the futility of withdrawal are
plentiful. When the United States gave notice that it was withdrawing
from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (Nuclear Forces
Treaty), Russia reciprocated by withdrawing as well. 56 One of the main
reasons for the proliferation of international treaties, including the
Nuclear Forces Treaty entered after the end of the Second World War,
was the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security. 57
It may very well be true that Russia had not been compliant and that
China, which was not a party to the treaty, was making significant
progress in weapons development without any constraints. However,
there doesn't seem to have been sufficient effort put into saving the treaty
by persuading Russia to come back into compliance, while allowing the
United States to make up for any effects arising from Russian noncompliance and persuading China to accede the treaty regime or face
certain consequences such as economic sanctions. The alternativehaving no arms reduction treaty to restrain the three nations from entering
into an unprecedented new arms race, with the accompanying dangers of
a nuclear conflagration-is unfathomable.
Another example of the futility of the "withdraw and rejoin" approach
relates to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Not only did the partnership not
collapse because of the withdrawal of the United States, it diminished the
influence of the United States in the region, particularly against an
increasingly strong economic nemesis-China. When the United States
withdraws, China is usually only too eager to fill the vacuum. As one
observer noted, staying in the Trans-Pacific Partnership would have "set
the U.S. up with 11 countries to take on China." 5 8 The United States
unilaterally taking on China through the use of tariffs in response to

55. Id.
56. Veronica Stracqualursi, Nicole Gaouette, Barbara Starr & Kylie Atwood, US Formally

Withdraws From Nuclear Treaty with Russia and Preparesto Test New Missile, CNN

POLITICS

(Aug. 2, 2019, 1:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/02/politics/nuclear-treaty-inf-uswithdraws-russia/index.html [https://perma.cc/9MX6-3M9U].
57. U.N. Charter pmbl. (The Charter of the United Nations opens with a solemn
proclamation and reminder that the primary purpose of the United Nations is "to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
mankind.").
58. Brendan Cole, Ohio Farmer Who Backed Trump Says He Won't Be Voting For Him in
2020: '7Have To Protect My Business,' NEWSWEEK (Aug. 9, 2019, 9:08 AM), https://www.news

week.com/cnbc-trade-war-soy-beans-gribbs-ohio-1453461
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China's unfair trade practices does not appear to have been an effective
strategy. 59
60
The United States withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal, but it was
6
unsuccessful in its push to have the allies do likewise. ' None of the U.S.
allies have left the Iran Nuclear Deal. Meanwhile Iran was welcomed into
what can be called the Eastern Axis (China, India, Russia and Japan) and
only two nations seemed enthusiastic about the administration's chaotic
approach to Iran-Israel and Saudi Arabia. 62
Instead of the traditional leadership role promoting international rule
of law and respect for human rights and democracy, the U.S.
administration appeared to endorse or remained silent on those issues as

59. Some observers have noted that while it is good to take on China, it is important to do
so using an appropriate approach. For example, one observer noted that "[t]o take on China there
has to be a multilateral approach. One country can't take on China." Mary Papenfuss, AFL-CIO
ChiefLashes Trump Administration For Hurting American Workers, HUFFPOST (Sept. 2, 2019,
https://www.huffpostcom/entry/richard-trumka-afl-cio-trump-hurting-american2:27 AM),

workersn_5d6c66f9e4b0cdfe0572 4bf [https://perma.cc/U2WG-CTVT].
60. Mark Landler, Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned, N.Y. TIMES,
(May 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.

html [https://perma.cc/BD6S-EKFQ]. The Arms Control Association describes the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or Iran Nuclear Deal as "a detailed, 159-page agreement
with five annexes reached by Iran and the P5+1 (China France, Germany, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) on July 14, 2015," which was subsequently "endorsed by UN
Security Council Resolution 2231, adopted on July 20, 2015." The Joint Comprehensive Plan of

Action (JCPOA) at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL Ass'N, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/
JCPOA-at-a-glance [https://perma.cc/26HE-U4W2] (last visited on Aug. 1, 2019).
61. Kali Robinson, What Is the Status of the Iran Nuclear Agreement?, COUNCIL FOREIGN
REL. (Feb. 25, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal
(reporting that "[fjollowing the U.S. withdrawal, several countries, U.S. allies among them,
continued to import Iranian oil under waivers granted by the Trump administration, and Iran
continued to abide by its commitments").
62. David Wainer, Trump Isolated on Iran as World Sees Confusion in U.S. Strategy,
BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-18/
trump-isolated-on-iran-as-world-sees-confusion-in-u-s-strategy [https://perma.cc/AR4X-LE7P].
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exemplified by the cases of North Korea, 63 RussiaF Venezuela 65 and

63. The U.S. Administration began a series of negotiations with North Korea aimed at
convincing the North Korean regime to dismantle its Nuclear Weapons program in exchange for
the lifting of economic sanctions. To date, those talks have been fruitless. Instead, the talks may
have legitimized the North Korea regime to a degree and given it time to test and expand its
nuclear arsenal. See Andrew Blake, Defector says Trump is 'legitimizing' Kim Jong-un Regime,
WASH. TIMES (July 6, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/ul/6/donad-trumplegitimizing-kim-regime-north-korea-v/ [https://perma.cc/W8ZJ-6NST]; Sharon Shi and Cl6ment
Burge, While Trump and Kim Talk, North Korea Appears to Expand Its Nuclear Arsenal, The
WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2019, 11:23 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/while-trump-and-kim-talknorth-korea-appears-to-expand-its-nuclear-arsenal-11564059627 [https://perma.cc/ZF7U-75CS].
Even if engaging North Korea is worth trying, the strategy is likely to have only limited success
without the support of China-North Korea's greatest supporter-with which the United States
is engaged in a protracted trade war. See Koh, supra note 9, at 448 (noting that after causing
diplomatic waves with the declaration that recognition of Taiwan was being considered, "Trump
has now been schooled by Beijing [China] that he needs Chinese cooperation to put diplomatic
pressure on Pyongyang [North Korea]."). It is unlikely that North Korea will give up its nuclear
weapons just because of the mere promise of economic prosperity until it is "confronted by
concerted, unified multilateral diplomacy and relief from sanctions." Id. at 448. A multilateral
approach resembling the Six Party Talks (the two Koreas, Russia, China, Japan, Taiwan, and the
United States) would probably be a better approach. Id. at 449.
64. From crackdown on political opposition and torture to restrictions on freedoms of

assembly and speech, disability, sexual and gender discrimination, Russia has reportedly violated
human rights, and yet the U.S. government has not been able to speak up clearly and equivocally
in denunciation of those acts. See Russia Events of 2018, HuM. Rs. WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/russia
[https://perma.cc/6YC6-JX4G]
(last visited on Aug. 17, 2019). Russia's continued support of rebels and atrocities committed in
Eastern Ukraine have gone largely unaddressed by the United States in recent years. See Koh,
supra note 9, at 452-53.
65. A report of the United Nations .Human Rights Council indicates that over the last
decade, Venezuelan authorities deployed a strategy "aimed at neutralizing, repressing and
criminalizing political opponents and people critical of the Government." See Human Rights
Council, Rep. of the U.N. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts. on the Situation of Human Rights in the

Bolivarian

Republic

of Venezuela,

U.N.

Doc. A/HRC/41/18,

at 7 (Oct.

9, 2019),

https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/41/18
[https://perma.cc/JV8T-97TM].
Additionally, rampant
corruption in Venezuela has led to a political and humanitarian crisis of gigantic proportions.
Research by Human Rights Watch and Center for Humanitarian Health and the Center for Public
Health and Human Rights at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health found,
[A] health system in utter collapse with increased levels of maternal and infant
mortality; the spread of vaccine-preventable diseases, such as measles and

diphtheria; and increases in numbers of infectious diseases such as malaria and
tuberculosis (TB). Although the government stopped publishing official data on
nutrition in 2007, research by Venezuelan organizations and universities
documents high levels of food insecurity and child malnutrition, and available
data shows high hospital admissions of malnourished children. A massive
exodus of Venezuelans-more than 3.4 million in recent years, according to the

UN-is straining health systems in receiving countries.
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Saudi Arabia. 66 The U.S. government declined taking decisive action
such as imposing sanctions to ensure that regimes in those countries
understand that human rights atrocities have consequences. The United
States has a unique leadership role that can be exercised by speaking out
against violations of international norms.
The muted response of the U.S. government to Russian interference
in the 2016 electoral process67 in the U.S. can be tantamount to condoning
of those actions. The Charter of the United Nations provides that one of
the purposes of the United Nations is to "develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace." 68 With respect to this purpose, the Charter
further provides that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the UnitedNations."69 Interference in the electoral
process is inconsistent with these Charter provisions. The United States
should have considered using appropriate lawful countermeasures that
would target Russian cyber-assets that were used to attack the electoral
systems in the United States. 7 0 Yet, the U.S. Senate repeatedly rejected
Venezuela's HumanitarianEmergency--Large-Scale UN Response Needed to Address Health
and Food Crises, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/04/04/
[https://
venezuelas-humanitarian-emergency/large-scale-un-response-needed-address-health

perma.cc/SW2X-8ZNY].
66. Margaret McGuinness, PayingLip Service to Human Rights: The Value ofPresidential
WASHBURN L. J. 471, 486 (2017). See also Rex Tillerson, Sec'y of State,
Remarks to U.S. Department of State Employees (May 3, 2017), https://2017-2021.state.
gov/remarks-to-u-s-department-of-state-employees/index.html [https://perma.cc/KN9P-MWFN]
(stating that "we really have to understand, in each country or each region of the world that we're

Human Rights Talk, 56

dealing with, what are our national security interests, what are our economic prosperity interests,
and then as we can advocate and advance our values ... "). After the blatant and openly brutal

murder of Khashoggi in the Saudi Arabian embassy in Istanbul, Turkey, the U.S. went ahead with
the sale of American weapons to the regime and the U.S. Senate "failed to override President
Donald Trump's veto of three resolutions that would have stopped the sale of Raytheon Co

precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia." Patricia Zengerle, U.S. Lawmakers Still
Plot to Push Saudi Arabia on Rights, Despite Trump, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2019, 5:44 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-arms/u-s-lawmakers-still-plot-to-push-saudi-arabia

-on-rights-despite-trump-idUSKCN1URSTI [https://perma.cc/F7RH-TWEN].
67. See Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential
Election, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. 57 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf.

68. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2.
69. Id. art. 2, 1 4 (Italicization supplied).
70. See, e.g., Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the

United States of America and France, Arbitral Award, 18 Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 417, 54 I.L.R.
304 (Dec. 9, 1978), https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XVIII417-493.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6CVM-34YX] (an international arbitral tribunal, concluding in that case that the U.S.
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efforts to enact legislation that would deter further interference in the U.S.
elections. Those efforts would probably provide for federal funding to
ensure that the electoral process is secure and deters foreign influence.
Not enacting such legislation7 ' is tantamount to sending the wrong
message to foreign actors, including Russia, because it is akin to leaving
the door open and the building less secure with the awareness that the
enemy is still planning to attack. 72
Ignoring international norms is equivalent in some respects to what
China and Russia have done in recent times to erode international rule of
law. For example, when the Philippines brought before the Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) a dispute against China arising over the South
China Sea, 73 China refused to attend the proceedings or to abide by the
decision of PCA. 74 Russia also acted in a similar manner with respect to
a case brought by Ukraine before the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea (ITLOS), in response to Russia's seizure of three Ukrainian
naval vessels and the arrest and detainment of the 24 servicemen aboard

-

countermeasure in response to an unlawful act by France was justified and proportionate to the
prior illegal act by France).
71. U.S. Congress passed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
which was veto proof, but the U.S. government has not been pushing for more legislation that
would specifically target electoral security. See Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), Pub. L. No. 115-44, 131 Stat. 886 (2017), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3364/text [https://perma.cc/C5B2-9KEM]. In fact, the U.S.
government has been reluctant to impose any further sanctions against Russia or adopt stiffer
legislation to the same end. See Patricia Zengerle, U.S. Senators to Try Again to Pass Russia
Sanctions Bill, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-sanctions
exclusive/u-s-senators-to-try-again-to-pass-russia-sanctions-bill-idUSKCN1Q22J9
[https://perma.
cc/YD84-6BWB] (reporting that "Trump ... [had] gone along with some previous congressional
efforts to increase sanctions on Russia, though sometimes reluctantly.").

72. Zachary B. Wolf, Russians are still meddling in US elections, Mueller said. Is anybody
Listening?, CNN (July 25, 2019, 2:04 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/24/politics/russiatrump-election-interference/index.html [https://perma.cc/6KT4-6GB2] (reporting that Special
Counsel Mueller said that "[t]hey're doing it [interfering in U.S. electoral process] as we sit
here."). In response to criticisms that the U.S. Senate was not doing anything about securing the
U.S. electoral process and safeguarding the sovereignty of the United States, Senate Leader Mitch
McConnell, stated that "I'm open to considering legislation but it has to be directed in a way that
doesn't undermine state and local elections. The Democrats would like to nationalize everything.
They want the federal government to take over the election process because they think that would
somehow benefit them." Ted Barrett, Manu Raju & Clare Foran, Why Mitch McConnell is
Rejecting Hill Calls on Election Security, As House Dems Plan New Push, CNN (June 14, 2019,
4:46 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/14/politics/mcconnell-election-security/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2LD8-CDKP].

73. South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award,
4, 7-10 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086

¶¶ 1-2,

[https://perma.cc/

ZAC8-5NCN].
74. Id. ¶ 15.
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the vessels on November 25, 2018, by subsequently refusing to attend
75
any of the proceedings brought by Ukraine before the ITLOS.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government has not been forceful enough to
condemn Russia's violation of the United Nations Charter vis-a-vis its
76
aggression against Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Far
from condemning those actions, the U.S. government -has instead
supported the idea of readmitting Russia to the group of the seven most
77
industrialized nations (G8) without Russia first giving up Crimea.
These actions and inaction tend to embolden those regimes and
legitimizes their actions. That is what happened in regard to the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change. Professor Jack Smith observed that the
U.S. government's assaults on the "Paris Agreement framework have
given some nations cover to take it less seriously and have created
disincentives for other nations to meet their Paris pledges while the
heavy-polluting United States violates its own pledge." 78
In regard to the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, it should
be noted that the withdrawal of the United States-with no allies
following suit-only resulted in further United States isolation from a
platform that is crafting hi-tech solutions to the overwhelming scientific
79
evidence of global climate change that is impacting the entire planet.
75. See Case Concerning the Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukraine v.
Russian Federation), Case No. 26, Order of May 25, 2019, ¶¶ 25, 118, https://www.itlos.org/
en/main/cases/li st-of-cases/case-concerning-the-detention-of-three-ukrainian-naval-vessel

ukraine-v-russian-federation-provisional-measures/

[https://perma.cc/2LBW-SAZD]

s-

(ordering

that the Russian Federation immediately release the 24 detained Ukrainian servicemen and allow
them to return to Ukraine and release the Ukrainian naval vessels and return them to the custody
of Ukraine). Russia refused to abide by the order. See Halya Coynash, Russia Refuses to Free 24

Ukrainian POWS Despite an International Tribunal Order it Must Obey, HuM. RTS. IN UKR. (June
26, 2019), http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1561498611 [https://perma.cc/7ANM-XPKZ].
76. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (The U.N. Charter provides that "All Members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the

United Nations.")
77. Kylie Atwood & Betsy Klein, Trump and Macron Agree That Russia Should Be Invited
To Next Year's G7 Conference, Senior Admin Official Says, CNN (Aug. 7, 2019, 11:25 AM),
[https://perma
https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/20/politics/donald-trump-russia-g8-g7/index.html
to condemn
failure
Trump's
of
example
"another
yet
is
this
that
(observing
.cc/5MYL-2MJJ]

Russia for its aggressive behavior and his ongoing push to restore more normal relations.").

-

78. Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 412.
79. Because the Paris Agreement on Climate Change entered into force in 2016, it was
unclear what short-term legal effect such an announcement would have beyond the refusal to
comply with the agreement. The Paris agreement provides that notice to withdraw from the treaty
cannot be submitted until after "three years from the date on which this Agreement has entered
into force." The earliest that the U.S. could give an effective notice to withdraw was November
2019. Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 28,
2 6
1 1, Apr. 22, 2016, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/20l9/0 /1
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Perhaps it is not surprising that allies would sometimes not walk the same
line as the United States, because even allies do not like to be pushed
around. As one U.S. leader acknowledged during a visit to Europe, "there
have been times where America has shown arrogance and been
dismissive, even derisive." 80
It is not just withdrawal from international treaties that can be
problematic. Equally problematic is the slow ratification of international
treaties, a process that may result in the languishing of those treaties. The
United States Senate has been slow in its ratification of international
treaties even after they have been signed by the United States. In other
cases, the United States ratifies international agreements but neglects to
meet its obligations under the treaty.
For example, U.S. Senate ratified International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights in 1994, and it obligated the U.S. to produce reports on
racial discrimination in the United States every two years. "The reports
were to include anywhere in the world where the U.S. military is in
charge. In other words, the United States military no matter where it was
on the globe, agreed to report discrimination." 8 ' However, the U.S. failed
to live up to those promises. On December 30, 2011, the U.S. filed its
fourth report on compliance with the Covenant, over a year late and
lacking in the agreed upon substance. 8 2 In particular, the report failed to
mention anything about police reactions'to Occupy Protests and offered
next to nothing on compliance at the state and local level. 83 Furthermore,
the report failed to address Abu Ghraib, or Guantanamo and other areas
of interest to the U.N. Human Rights Committee in the report. 84 By
1104-Multilateral-Environment-and-Conservation-Climate-Change.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9YV
-BB2P] (entered into force Nov: 4, 2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
80. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by President Obama at Strasbourg Town Hall
(Apr. 3, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama
-strasbourg-town-hall [https://perma.cc/57UE-YFD3].
81. Leslie Griffith, US. Quietly Breaks UN. Treaty, HUFFPOST (Feb. 25, 2008, 2:42 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leslie-griffith/us-quietly-breaks-un-trea_b_88347.html
[https://
perma.cc/3U49-VS4E].
82. Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America to the United Nations
Committee on Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Dec. 30, 2011), https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/179781.htm
[https://perma.cc/F3EV-HVH5].

83. Id.
84. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding observationson the fourth periodic report of
the United States of America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014),
https://undocs.org/CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 [https://perma.cc/DM9D-CNLD] (observing that the
U.N. Human Rights Committee was "concerned at the limited number of investigations,
prosecutions and convictions of members of the Armed Forces and other agents of the United
States Government, including private contractors, for unlawful killings during its international
operations, and the use of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
of detainees in United States custody, including outside its territory, as part of the so-called
"enhanced interrogation techniques."").
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failing to provide these reports in a timely fashion, or to live up to the
expectations agreed upon in the Covenant, it made the U.S. appear to not
take this agreement seriously. This shows a serious lack of compliance
with international agreements and raises the question of whether this was
ratified just for show. It takes more than entering into an agreement to
change the way the world views the United States. The U.S. must not
only enter into these agreements but show that it takes these agreements
seriously and that it is willing to fulfill its obligations under them.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the withdrawal or "repeal
first, replace later" approach has had success in some cases. The United
States announced that it would withdraw from NAFTA-the North
America Free Trade Agreement and then replace it with a version that
better comports with the national interest of the United States. The
fortunes of Mexico and Canada are so inextricably intertwined with those
of the United States that the three countries did all they could to agree on
a replacement for the tripartite NAFTA-United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement (USMCA). For the United States in particular, replacing
NAFTA was imperative in light of the "waning support in the rural sector
due to [the U.S. administration's] trade wars." 85 If USMCA is what the
United States says it is-that is, that it is the "largest, fairest, most
86 "a colossal
balanced, and modern trade agreement ever achieved,"
victory for our farmers, ranchers, energy workers, factory workers, and
American workers," 8 7 that replaces "outsourcing with a truly fair and
reciprocal trade deal that will keep jobs, wealth, and growth right here in
America," 88 then it is a noteworthy achievement.
However, critics of UMSCA insist that "[t]he deal replacing the North
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) offers little for smaller farmers
and will negatively impact consumers," 89 because the deal did not
"address low prices for products by independent family farmers,"90 "[did]
not reinstate "country of origin" labeling for beef, pork, and dairy
products, thus making it harder for U.S. farmers to compete against
cheaper imports," 9 1 or address climate change, which "... does nothing
85. Brendan Cole, Trump's New Trade Deal USMCA Was 'Oversold' and Will Hurt

Smaller Farmers, Says Rural Coalition,

NEWSWEEK

(Dec.

16,

2019,

12:22

PM),

https:/www.newsweek.com/usmca-trump-farms-rural-national-family-farm-coalition-1477459

[https://permacc/W9T4-XLS6].
86. Donald Trump, U.S. President Trump's Remarks by President Trump at a Signing

Ceremony for the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement, MIRAGE, (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.miragenews. com/us-president-trump-s-remarks-at-a-signing-ceremony-for-unitedstates-mexico-canada-trade-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/6KXV-T9YY].

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Cole, supra note 85.
Id.
Id.
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to curb the environmental damage that was part of the original
NAFTA." 92 It may also be easier to withdraw from and replace a tripartite
agreement than a more multilateral treaty like the Transpacific
Partnership Agreement.
In a post-9/l1 world, the challenge has also been whether the United
States would disregard the international rule of law in its pursuit of the
"war" against terrorists. 93 The challenge was whether the United States
would pursue a multilateral rather than unilateral approach. In this
respect, the U.S. has largely been successful. The multilateral approach
would serve to "broaden the base of support among other countries, thus
increasing the possibility of success in the overall anti-terrorist
campaign." 94 The United States actively worked to block attempts to
characterize U.S. objectives as a "clash of civilizations" or a religious
war. 95 To avoid that result, the United States endeavored to show that it
did not regard international terrorism as being synonymous with Islam.
One U.S. President characterized the relationship between the Islamic
world and America as one that was "based on mutual interest and mutual
respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not
exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share
common principles - principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the
dignity of all human beings." 96
In sum, it cannot generally be concluded that the recent approach to
international law has been effective in promoting the national interest of
the United States. The withdrawal of the United States from international
treaties and platforms may have delayed or prevented the achievement of
important international objectives for the U.S. and international rule of
law in general.
II. RECENT U.S. JUDICIAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
The interpretation and application of international law presents
another issue for the United States, as it is important to uphold domestic
policies as well as be a supportive member in the international
community. Overall, the record of the judicial branch has been to restrict
the applicability of international law in the United States, while
emphasizing U.S. law.

92. Id.
93. See generally Head, supra note 54.
94. Id. at 8.
95. Id.; see also, Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 29

(1992-1993).
96. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on a New Beginning at Cairo
University, Cairo, Egypt (June 4, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09 [https://perma.cc/4SHB-YEEU].
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One example of the Supreme Court's restriction of international law
97
was epitomized by United States decision in the Medellin v. Texas
(Medellin) which, in essence, determined that the U.S. did not have to
comply with a decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) if U.S.
law conflicted with international law. The United States Supreme Court
decision in Medellin was in response to the ruling of the ICJ in the Case
ConcerningAvena and Other Mexican Nationals (Avena),98 in which the
ICJ required of the United States and, specifically, Texas, to conduct a
retrial of several Mexican nationals who had been sentenced to death
following criminal proceedings in Texas. 99
In the Avena decision, the ICJ found that the U.S. violated the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), which required consular
notification in cases of an alien undergoing criminal prosecution in a
State party to that treaty.100 In this case, the Mexican consulate had not
been notified of the prosecution of the Mexican nationals.' 0 1 In light of
that, the ICJ determined that the Mexican nationals should not be
executed without review and a determination that their rights under
VCCR had not been compromised. 0 2 The U.S. Congress did not pass
03
legislation that would obligate Texas to abide by the ICJ decision.1
The executive branch, however, issued a non-binding memorandum
to urge Texas to comply.1 04 Texas refused to review the Mexican
national's case. On a petition for stay of execution, the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the petition on the grounds that the ICJ Avena decision was
not self-executing and therefore had no binding effect in the U.S. absent
an implementing legislation.1 05 Medellin-one of the seven Mexican

97. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
98. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004

1.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31, 2004), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/128/128-

2

00 4 03 3 1-

JUD-01-00-EN.pdf [https://permacc/LY8E-LDGR] [hereinafter Avena].

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. ¶ 153(11)
Id. 1153(4)
Id.
Id. ¶ 153(9).

103. It is noteworthy that while the President George W. Bush Administration tried to steer
away from international law at the beginning of that administration, towards the end it tried to reengage international law. See Koh, supra note 9, at 420 (observing that "[a]fter September 11,

George W. Bush, like Donald Trump, headed sharply toward a strategy of "disengage -black holehard power," but he visibly reverted toward the use of smart power by the time he left office.").

104. See The Medellin "Memorandum "from the President, OPINIoJURIS, http://opiniojuris
.org/2005/03/02/the-medellin-memorandum-from-the-president/ [https://perma.cc/S7ZT-RBLZ].

105. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (holding that "The Avena judgment creates an
international law obligation on the part of the United States, but it is not automatically binding
domestic law because none of the relevant treaty sources-the Optional Protocol, the U.N.
Charter, or the ICJ Statute-creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing

legislation, and no such legislation has been enacted.").
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nationals-was then subsequently and promptly executed.1 06 The United
States then quickly withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, whose provisions had been found by
the ICJ to be binding on the United States as the basis for the compulsory
jurisdiction of ICJ over disputes arising under the VCCR.1 07
The ICJ subsequently ruled that the U.S. was also in violation of its
international obligations in not using whatever means necessary, such
enacting legislation to implement the earlier Avena decision, in order to
preserve the rights of the Mexican nationals. 08 This case exemplifies that
the United States was not willing to enact legislation to fulfill its
international obligations. In sum, the case illustrates the judiciary's
prioritization of national law and procedures over international law,
effectively endorsing the executive branch's failure to uphold its
international law.1 09 It is not as if the court was not aware that the refusal
to uphold international obligations could have an impact on how other
countries apply international law in cases affecting U.S. nationals. Justice
Stevens warned in Medellin v. Texas 1 0 that the "costs of refusing to
106. Avena, supra note 98, ¶ 52.
107. See United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=TREATY&mtdsgno= ll-8&chapter--3 [https://perma.cc/9LNY-LT73], at endnote 1.
108. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 61(2) (Jan.
19,
2009),
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/139/139-20090119-JUD-01-00EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM4E-RREJ] [hereinafter Interpretation in Avena].
109. It is noteworthy that the U.S. Constitution puts international law at the same level with
U.S. Federal Law, and thus subordinates state law to international law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2 (providing that "[t]his Constitution, and the Law of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby."
Also, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties-whose provisions the U.S. regards as
consistent with customary international law-provides that "[a] party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without
prejudice to article 46." VCLT, supra note 4, art. 17. In spite of this, the U.S. sought to argue that
the controversy between Texas and the U.S. government regarding whether Texas was obligated
to give effect to the ICJ decision was "strictly a matter of United States domestic law," which
appears to indicate that the U.S. neglected or simply refused to comply with an international
obligation by its failure to ensure that U.S. domestic law was not at odds with international law.
Interpretation in Avena, supra note 98. The U.S. cannot excuse this failure by pointing to the
failure of the U.S. Congress to enact appropriate legislation because the executive branch could
have implemented the ICJ decision through an executive agreement, which would be selfexecuting, as long as there is no conflicting Federal statute. See RESTATEMENT (THrRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED)

§ 115 (AM. L. INST.

1987).

110. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held
that the United States had violated Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations by failing to inform 51 named Mexican nationals, including petitioner Medellin, of their
Vienna Convention rights. Avena, supra note 98, ¶ 153(4). The ICJ found that those named
individuals were entitled to review and reconsideration of their convictions and sentences
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respect the ICJ's judgment are significant. The entire Court and the
President agree that breach will jeopardize the United States' 'plainly
compelling' interests in 'ensuring the reciprocal observance of the
Vienna Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and
1
demonstrating commitment to the role of international law.'"" Justice
Stevens' warning is consistent with the perspective of the ICJ. In a
follow-up decision, the ICJ emphasized that it is in the interest of states
to take international obligations seriously.1 1 2 The ICJ observed
[C]onsiderations of domestic law which have so far
hindered the implementation of the obligation incumbent
upon the United States, cannot relieve it of its obligation. A
choice of means was allowed to the United States in the
implementation of its obligation and, failing success within
a reasonable period of time through the means chosen, it
must rapidly turn to alternative and effective means of
attaining that result.' '3
ICJ even obliquely critiqued the U.S. Supreme Court's view of
International Law:
The Court notes - without necessarily agreeing with certain
points made by the [U.S.] Supreme Court in its reasoning
regarding international law - that the Supreme Court has
stated that the Avena Judgment creates an obligation that is
binding on the United States. This is so notwithstanding that
it has said that the obligation has no direct effect in domestic

regardless of their failure to comply with generally applicable state rules governing challenges to
criminal convictions. Id. ¶ 153(9). President George W. Bush then issued a memorandum stating
that the United States would "discharge its international obligations" under Avena "by having
State courts give effect to the decision." Relying on Avena and the President's Memorandum,

Medellin filed a second Texas state-court habeas application challenging his state capital murder
conviction and death sentence on the ground that he had not been informed of his vienna

Convention rights. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellin's application as an
abuse of the writ, concluding that neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum was binding

Federal law that could displace the State's limitations on filing successive habeas applications.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum
constituted directly enforceable Federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of

successive habeas petitions.
111. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 491.
112. Interpretation in Avena, supra note 98, ¶ 4 (Mexico requested the ICJ to order that the
United States must take any and all steps necessary to ensure that no Mexican national entitled to
review and reconsideration under the Avena Judgment is executed unless and until that review
and reconsideration is completed and it is determined that no prejudice resulted from the
violation.).

113. Id. ¶47.
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law, and that it cannot be given effect by a Presidential
Memorandum." 4
The United States could have done exactly that in Medellin v. Texas.
In a similar case, the United States tried to do what it should have done
in Medellin v. Texas. In Garcia v. Texas," 5 the Supreme Court denied
certiorari for Garcia after a denial for his application for post-conviction
writ of habeas corpus and motion for stay of execution. Garcia, a Mexican
national, was not granted consular access as guaranteed under Article 36
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).11 6 This Article
of the VCCR was established with the "view to facilitating the exercise
of consular functions relation to nationals of the sending State," and
provides for consular access to a nation of that State who is "arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other
manner." 117
After being sentenced to death for the kidnapping, raping and
murdering of a 16-year-old girl, the U.S. administration appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court to delay the impending execution of the Mexican
national 18 in order to give Congress time to act on the Consular
Notification Compliance Act, to provide the opportunity for the judicial
review required by international law.11 9 The State Department raised the
concern of reciprocity, stating, "[i]f we don't protect the rights of nonAmericans in the United States, we seriously risk reciprocal lack of
access to our own citizens overseas." 2 0 The U.S. administration clearly
did not want a repeat of the Avena case.
114. Id. ¶ 36 (Emphasis added).
115. Garciav. Texas, 565 U.S. 806 (2011) (stating "Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court
of Criminal Appeals of Texas dismissed as moot."). See also Ex parteLeal, No. WR-41, 743-03,

2011 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 484, at *2-3,2011 WL 2581917 (Tex. Crim. App. June 27,
2011) (denying Garcia's second application for writ of habeas corpus as well as his motion for
stay of execution).

116. Garcia, 564 U.S. at 940.
117. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36,

¶ 1(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S.

261 (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967), https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
conventions/9_2_1963.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RMG-8HSH].

118. Garcia, 564 U.S. at 940.
119. Adam Liptak, Mexican Citizen Is Executed as Justices Refuse to Step In, N.Y.

TIMES

(July 7, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/us/08execute.html#:~:text=Mexican%20
Citizen%201s%20Executed%20as%20Justices%20Refuse%20to%20Step%20In,-By%20Adam
%20Liptak&text=WASHINGTON%20%E2%80%94%201n%20a%205%2Dto,on%20death%20

row%20in%20Texas [https://perma.cc/7FB5-TLLJ] (reporting that "split along ideological lines,
the Supreme Court on Thursday evening rebuffed a request from the Obama administration that
it stay the execution of a Mexican citizen on death row in Texas").
120. Reuters Staff, U.S. seeks to limit damage of Texas execution case, REUTERS (July 8,
2011, 5:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-mexico-execution/u-s-seeks-to-limitdamage-of-texas-execution-case-idUSTRE7676YT20110708?feedType=RSS&feedName-top
News [https://perma.cc/C3R8-TZ6R].
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Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. noted that "[t]he execution of
Humberto Leal Garcia, who was sentenced to death for the 1994 crimes,
'would place the United States in irreparable breach of its internationallaw obligation .. .'."121 The U.S. government added, "complying with its
obligations to 'notify consuls in such cases would serve U.S. interests as
well as those of the condemned man,"' 122 and would contribute to the
"protection Americans abroad, fostering cooperation with foreign
23
nations, and demonstrating respect for the international rule of law."1
Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court did not heed those concerns, and
Garcia was executed. 12 4 This case did not go unnoticed. In response to
this disregard for international agreements, Mexico openly condemned
the execution, saying it violated an International Court of Justice's ruling
ordering the United States to review capital convictions of Mexican

nationals. 125
There is still a major question of whether an ICJ judgment does or
26
does not automatically become a part of U.S. domestic law.1 What is
sure is that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that
"[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty." 12 7 The United States could, in
appropriate circumstances, advocate for clauses in treaties that provide
for dispute resolution by an international tribunal and indicate in those
clauses that domestic courts of State parties treat decisions of such a
12 8 The second approach
tribunal as binding on their domestic courts.
could be for the executive branch, when submitting treaties to the Senate
for advice and consent to ratification, to express its view as to the selfexecuting nature of these treaties.1 2 9 If the Senate were to agree with the
121. CNN Wire Staff, Obama and U.N. Seek Delay in Execution ofMexican National, CNN
(July 2, 2011), http://edition.cnn.com/201 I/CRIME/07/0 1 /texas.death.row.inmate/ [https://perma

.cc/GD69-KE4J].
122. FOREIGN NATIONALS: Obama Administration and UN. High Commissioner Seek
Relieffor Texas Death Row Inmate, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 5, 2011), https://death
penaltyinfo.org/news/foreign-nationals-obama-administration-and-u-n-high-commissioner-seek-

relief-for-texas-death-row-inmate [https://perma.cc/G76B-KH64].
123. CNN Wire Staff, supra note 121.
124. Liptak, supra note 119.
125. Jon Herskovitz, Texas Executes Mexican NationalDespite Diplomatic Uproar, Reuters
(Jan. 22, 2014, 7:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-execution-texas-mexico/texas-to[https://
execute-mexican-national-in-face-of-diplomatic-protest-idUSL2NOKW02K20140122

perma.cc/FRW9-TM5Y].
126. See Joseph Keller, Sovereignty vs. Internationalism and Where United States Courts
Should Find International Law, 24 PENN ST. INT'L. L. REV. 353, 372 (2005),
https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer-https://www.google.com/&httpsredir-l

&article=1753&context-psilr [https://perma.cc/G2GR-VL2Z].
127. VCLT, supra note 4, art. 27.
128. See Keller, supra note 126, at 372.

129. Id.
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executive branch's view, it is likely that the courts would accept the
combined view of the political branches, although the judiciary would
still have the authority to make the final determination.) 0
Medellin v. Texas and Garciav. Texas are not isolated cases. There is
a consistent pattern of judicial restriction of international norms that
emerges out of many other cases going back several years. A result
similar to Medellin v. Texas occurred in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.'3 1
This decision was issued after the ICJ had made its decision in the Avena
case. Once again, this case concerned the obligations of the United States
under the VCCR. The case consolidated the appeals of Moises SanchezLlamas, a Mexican national charged for his involvement in an exchange
of gunfire with police in Oregon, and Mario Bustillo, a Honduran national
convicted of first-degree murder in Virginia. 13 2 On appeal, both
defendants raised VCCR questions asking:
(1) whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention grants
rights that may be invoked by individuals in a judicial
proceeding; (2) whether suppression of evidence is a proper
remedy for a violation of Article 36; and (3) whether an
Article 36 claim may be deemed forfeited under state
procedural rules because a defendant failed to raise the claim
at trial.

33

The court held that although "there are some times when a Convention
violation, standing alone, might warrant suppression, or the displacement
of a State's ordinarily applicable procedural default rules, neither
Sanchez-Llamas' case nor Bustillo's belongs in that category." 13 4 The
Court held that "[a]lthough the ICJ's interpretation deserves 'respectful
consideration' ... it does not compel [the Supreme Court] to reconsider
[its] understanding of the [Vienna] Convention." 1 This case once again
showed that the judicial branch was unwilling to recognize VCCR
obligations.
There are some cases, however, in which the United States Supreme
Court upheld norms of international law. For instance, in Massachusetts
v. EPA, 36 the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged a causal link between
greenhouse gas emissions, global warming, hurricane strength and
resulting damages, and as a result held that the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts had standing to petition for review of an Environmental
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
Id. at 339-42.
Id. at 342.

134. Id. at 364-365 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

135. Id. at 353 (citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) which held that the Vienna
Convention did not trump the procedural-default doctrine).

136. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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Protection Agency (EPA) decision not to regulate greenhouse gas
13 7 The Court's
emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act.
decision remanded back to EPA the issue of whether carbon emissions
constitute human endangerment. In April 2009, the agency concluded the
scientific review ordered by the Court and announced its "endangerment
fmding," officially declaring that greenhouse gases are pollutants that
threaten public health and welfare.1 38
To the extent that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected international
norms, however, several lower courts have followed its lead. For
example, in Igartua v. U.S.1 39 the court reluctantly rejected the argument
that international customary law and treaty law bound the United States
to grant the right to vote to Puerto Ricans, on the grounds that the U.S.
40
Constitution does not grant statehood to Puerto Rico.1 In denying effect
to what is almost a universal right to vote-arguably a norm of a
customary international law' 41-the court argued that if an international
norm of democratic governance exists, "it is at a level of enerality so
high as to be unsuitable for importation into domestic law." 2
That refusal to uphold customary international law is in contrast to
43
another lower court's approach in Filartigav. Pena-Irala,1 where the
court allowed an Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claim to proceed, holding that
"torture perpetrated under the color of official authority violated
universally accepted norms of international human rights" and had to be
deterred. 144
137. Id. at 534-35.
138. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Clears Way for Greenhouse Gas Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/science/earth/18endanger.html [https://perma.cc/

MF6B-X7VG].
139. Igartna v. U.S., 626 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2010).
140. Id. at 611-12.
141. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) proclaims that "[e]veryone has
the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen

representatives." G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 21, 11, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.
Doc A/810, at 75 (Dec. 10. 1948), https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/217(111) [https://perma.cc/Z2CW7CHZ]. While the UDHR is not a treaty, its norms are arguably part of customary international
law. See International Human Rights Law: Non-Treaty Standards, LAWs.' RTs. WATCH CAN.,
https://www.lrwc.org/library/know-your-rights-index/international-law/non-treaty-standards/

[https://perma.cc/LU48-MSHR]

(last visited on July 18, 2019) (observing that "[s]ome

international law scholars are of the view that the UDHR has the status of customary international

law.").
142. Igartua, 626 F.3d at 602.
143. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
144. Id. at 861, 867. In fact, "[i]n the early 1980s, U.S. courts began to recognize alien
plaintiffs' claims against dictators, war criminals, and terrorists for torture, slavery, genocide, and
other egregious acts under the ATS. Courts recognized these claims as valid under the body of
law known as "customary international law." See Vanessa R. Waldref, The Alien Tort Statute
After Sosa: A Viable Tool In The Campaign To End Child Labor?, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.

L. 160, 163 (2010).
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It is noteworthy, however, that since the Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
decision in the 80's, the U.S. Supreme Court has been walking back from
the decision, in further restriction of international norms. In Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain,145 for example, the court determined that the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) is solely a jurisdictional statute1 4 6 and that it does not
itself provide a cause of action. 14 7 In Sosa, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff was not entitled to a remedy under the ATS alone, when
the Law of Nations (customary international law) did not specifically
provide for arbitrary arrest. 14 8 The Court argued that in 1789 when the
ATS was enacted, the Law of Nations and Common Law recognized only
a limited number of violations. which were specific or definite enough:
offences against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and piracy. 14 9
In other words, arbitrary arrest was not recognized or specifically defined
under the Law of Nations as to bring it within the purview of the ATS.
The Court went a step further in its restrictive approach by ruling that it
would not allow claims based on violations of human rights if those
abuses took place outside the territory of the United States because, in the
view of the court, the ATS did not apply extra-territorially. 50
The restrictive reading of the content of "Law of Nations" in Sosa, as
well as the determination that only cases that touched upon the territory
of the United States could be pursued in U.S. domestic courts, dealt a
severe blow to the number of claims that could be brought in U.S. courts
in order to enforce violations of international law. But it is not as if the
results of the courts in all of these cases are inevitable. The requirement
of specificity of crimes in Law of Nations was rejected by the Nuremburg
Tribunal after World War II in order to hold the defendants accountable
for horrendous human rights violations. In the Nuremburg Judgment
handed down by the International Military Tribunal, the Tribunal noted
that the defendants had argued that statutory law crimes against humanity
were not specifically provided for in prior positive law and thus could not
be punished.' 5

145. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
146. The ATS provides Federal district courts with jurisdiction over "any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
Alien's Action for Tort (Alien Tort Statute), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).

147. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713, 763.
148. Id. at 725.
149. Id. at 720.
150. Id. at 750; Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (S.D. Tex. 2015)
(holding that the Alien Tort Statute did not apply extraterritorially to confer subject matter
jurisdiction over human trafficking claims).

151. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (NUREMBERG), TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL M[LITARY TRIBUNAL 219 (1947), https://www.loc.gov/
rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZE8-FLGY].
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However, the Tribunal-of which U.S. judges were a part-held that
"the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being
unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go
15 3
an early U.S. Supreme Court
unpunished."'5 2 United States v. Smith"
Smith, one of the issues was
In
precedent.
decision-establishes a similar
whether the crime of piracy was defined by the law of nations with
reasonable certainty in a U.S. statute.15 4 The Court held that it sufficed
that piracy was defined in the Law of Nations.1 5 5
Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court has persisted in its restrictive approach
56
to international norms. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,1 for
example, the majority of the Court held that the principles underlying
presumption against extraterritoriality constrain courts exercising their
power under ATS, and that the ATS did not apply to violations of the
Law of Nations occurring within territory of a sovereign other than the
United States.1 57 In Kiobel, the Court concluded that it lacked ATS
jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims because the acts giving rise to their tort
claims occurred exclusively in Nigeria, a foreign sovereign. The
concurring Justices, Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan reasoned
that the presumption against extraterritoriality should not be used to
exclude jurisdiction under the ATS, but rather the dispositive
consideration should be whether the defendant's conduct adversely
affects an important American national interest, which includes a distinct
interest in preventing the U.S. from becoming a safe harbor for a torturer

152. Id. (Italicization supplied).
153. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820).

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (holding that nothing in the
statutory language provided a clear indication that the statute was intended to have extraterritorial
reach). That holding was premised on the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S.

legislation, which reflects the "longstanding principle of American law that 'legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.' ... " because "Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not

foreign matters." Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248, 255 (2010). In Kiobel,
the Supreme Court considered whether a claim brought under the ATS may reach conduct

occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 115. In that case, Nigerian
nationals (the petitioners)-who became legal residents of the United States after being granted
political asylum-brought tort claims under the ATS against certain British, Dutch, and Nigerian

corporations. Id. at 111-12. In their complaint, the petitioners contended that the corporate
defendants violated the Law of Nations by aiding and abetting atrocities committed by Nigerian
military and police forces, in providing those forces with food, transportation, compensation, and
access to property. Id. at 112. All the atrocities were alleged to have been committed in Nigeria,
and it was undisputed that none of the conduct alleged in the complaint occurred within the

territory of the United States. Id. at 111-13.
157. Id.
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and other common enemies of humankind."' That approach seems to be
more in accord with the reasoning in the Judgment at Nuremberg.
Further, in 2014 the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Bond
v. United States,1 59 once again indicating that it was persisting in its
restrictive approach to international law. The petitioner, Bond, used a
chemical to harm her husband's mistress. 160 She was indicted for
violating 18 U.S.C. § 229, which forbids knowing possession or use, for
nonpeaceful purposes, of a chemical that "can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans."'61 18 U.S.C. § 229 is
federal legislation implementing the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on their Destruction, a treaty that the United States ratified in 1997.162
Bond then brought a Tenth Amendment claim, challenging the statute on
the ground that the U.S. Congress had exceeded its constitutional
authority in enacting the implementing legislation.1 63 The issue was
whether the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act could
be properly interpreted so that it does not apply to ordinary poisoning
cases, which have been traditionally handled by state and local
authorities.164 Adopting a narrow interpretation in order to deny effect to
an international treaty, the Court held that federal law, including treaties
of the U.S., typically does not intrude on the ability of states to regulate
local matters, and that Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation
Act was not an exception to that general rule. 165
Maintaining the same posture, the U.S. Supreme Court recently sided
with the executive branch to uphold a Presidential Proclamation banning
Muslims from specified countries, reasoning that "[t]he Proclamation is
expressly premised on legitimate purposes: preventing entry of nationals
who cannot be adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve
their practices. The text says nothing about religion."1 66 This case, while
decided primarily on constitutional grounds, had international
implications and was consistent with the U.S. government's avowed
patriotic focus, as opposed to a globalist view. 167 As Justice Sotomayor
pointed out, the majority in Trump v. Hawaiifocused on national security
158. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 127-40.
159. Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
160. Id. at 852.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 848, 851.
163. Id. at 853.
164. Id. at 857.
165. Bond, 572 U.S. at 866.
166. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018).
167. See Clare Frances Moran, Crystallising the International Rule of Law: Trump's
Accidental Contribution to International Law, 56 WASHBURN L. J. 491, 492 (2017),
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/ 51169689.pdf.
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even though "a cursory review of the Government's asserted nationalthe Proclamation is nothing more than a
security rationale reveals that
68
'religious gerrymander."'1
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed international
norms in the context of immigration. Recently, the U.S. Administration
69
has promoted a policy aimed at a drastic reduction of refugees,1 even
when those efforts appeared to run afoul of relevant international law
norms.17 0 For example, although the U.S. is bound by the rule of
refoulment-the norm that refugees should not be returned to their
countries of origin-and, even though the U.S. is not a party to thirdparty-transition treaties, the U.S. advocated for immigrants and refugees
to wait in a third country that they were transiting through.171 The
government maintained that, "when somebody comes in, we must
immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring them back from where
they came[sic]" 172 This would be concerning because of "the
vulnerability of the immigrant population within the relevant legal and
social structure." 1 7 3 Yet, a sharply divided U.S. Supreme Court decided
that the U.S. government was within its rights to issue the travel ban on
74
people from certain states and to act the way it did. 1
Relatedly, a divided U.S.. Supreme Court signed off on the U.S.
government's policy regarding appropriation of funds for the building of
a border wall on the Mexico border. 7 5 Against the backdrop of efforts to
76
reduce the number of legal immigrants entering the United States,1 the
government decided to build the wall at the U.S. southern border, which
was emblematic of withdrawal and refusal to engage internationally.
The trade war with several countries and their rejection of tariffs
imposed on China by the World Trade Organization is another indication
of protectionism that is also characteristic of a lack of willingness to be
168. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2442.
169. See Koh, supra note 9, at 422.

170. See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3be0lb964.html [https://perma.cc/GC8B-93UQ].
171. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. II, 1 3, Jan. 1, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S.
606
6
.pdf [https://perma.cc/
270, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/JNTS/Volume%2060 /v
States Parties hereto
the
by
be
applied
shall
Protocol
present
"the
that
(providing
HX8V-L929]

without any geographic limitation.").
172. Katie Rogers & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Trump Calls for Depriving Immigrants Who
Illegally Cross Border of Due Process Rights, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes
[https://perma.cc/Y2
.com/2018/06/24/us/politics/trump-immigration-judges-due-process.html

78-ZPY3].
173. S.

I.

Strong, Can InternationalLaw Trump Trump's ImmigrationAgenda: Protecting

IndividualRights through ProceduralJus Cogens, U. ILL. L. REV. 272, 282 (2018).
174. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2392.
175. Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019).
176. See Reforming American Immigration for Strong Employment Act, S. 354, 115th Cong.
(2017).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol32/iss2/3

34

Isanga: The U.S. Withdraws: Impact on the U.S. and International Rule of

2020]1

THAE US. W17 HDRAWS

249

more open to the rest of the world.' 7 7 The irony of trade wars is that there
is no real winner of such wars, 17 8 which speaks to the inevitability of the
necessity of international rule of law. The U.S. federal government
essentially acknowledged as much when they reported that the Chinese
government was going to wait until after the next U.S. presidential
election in November 2021 before China would return to a more complete
trade deal including items such as smartphones and toys with the United
States.1 79 Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected efforts aimed at
challenging the government's steel tariffs in a case brought by the
American Institute for International Steel.
In a rare case, however, the U.S. government's attempt to add a
citizenship question to the national census questionnaire was ultimately
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court.1 80 The effort was aimed at
identifying the number of non-U.S. citizens in the United States. The U.S.
government's efforts to deport even DREAMers and to separate children
from their parents at the border showed that the government had become
emboldened to take extreme measures to promote a decidedly U.S.oriented policy. The U.S. Supreme Court signaled that it was not willing
to go that far.
The conclusions of the U.S. Supreme Court should not be considered
predictable because looking at the similar facts and international law to
which the United States has subscribed, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) has tended to come out differently. For instance, in response to the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bank Markazi v. Peterson,18 ' in which
177. Appellate Body Report, United States - CountervailingDuty Measures On Certain
Products From China, WTO Doc. WT/DS437/AB/RW (adopted July 16, 2019),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&Catalogueld
List=255675,255676&CurrentCatalogueIdndex=0&FulTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True
&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True [https://perma.cc/3LTK-9KAV] (holding
that while the U.S. was correct that China subsidized the cost of the production of Chinese
products, thereby taking advantage of being a developing state as classified by the UN, the U.S.
must accept Chinese pricing when calculating the tariffs-not calculations on pricing the U.S.
came up with-and that China had the option to respond with retaliatory measures against the
U.S. if Chinese pricing was not accepted.). See also Don Weinland, WTO Rules Against US in
Tariff Dispute With China, FiN. TIMES (July 17, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/131a55eaa84a-1 I e9-984c-fac8325aaa04 [https://perma.cc/T4DZ-EL9V].
&

178. For example, while the trade war between the U.S. and China has hit China's exports
hard, the U.S. manufacturing sector has also been decimated by the trade war. Ana Swanson
Jeanna Smialek, U.S. ManufacturingSlumps as Trade War Damage Lingers, N.Y. TiMES (Jan. 3,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/business/manufacturing-trump-trade-war.html
[https://perma.cc/K9P8-XW89].

179. Zeke Miller, Trump Says China Deal Could Wait Until After 2020 Election,
PRESS (Dec. 3, 2019), https://apnews.com/fbfc4c93ff424225b36c20527166fb08

ASSOCIATED

[https://perma.cc/7CRY-BVJL] (noting that "president has previously suggested that China
wanted to wait until after the election to negotiate a deal").
180. Department of Commerce et al. v. New York et al., 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576 (2019).

181. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016).
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the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's judgment for the
turnover of approximately $1.75 billion in assets of the Iranian national
bank in order to compensate victims of a 1983 bombing in Beirut,
82
Lebanon, Iran initiated an action against the U.S. before the ICJ. In
reaching that decision, the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected Iran's
arguments that it was entitled to foreign sovereign immunity, maintaining
that the terrorism exception applied, even though Iran explicitly rejects
the allegations of terrorism in the ICJ case. 8 3

182. Id. at 1319-20; Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2019 I.C.J. 10,11 (Feb.
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/164/164-20190213-JUD-01-002019),
13,
EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJD4-VACF] [hereinafter Certain Iranian Assets]. The ICJ notes the
history of the tense relationship between the United States and Iran as follows:

20. In October 1983, United States Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon,
were bombed, killing 241 United States servicemen who were part of a
multinational peacekeeping force. The United States claims that Iran is
responsible for this bombing and for subsequent acts of terrorism and violations

of international law; Iran rejects these allegations.
21. In 1984, the United States designated Iran as a "State sponsor of terrorism",

a designation which has been maintained ever since.
22. In 1996, the United States amended its Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(hereinafter the "FSIA") so as to remove the immunity from suit before its courts

of States designated as "State sponsors of terrorism" in certain cases involving
allegations of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or

the provision of material support for such acts (Section 1605 (a) (7) of the FSIA);
it also provided exceptions to immunity from execution applicable in such cases

(Sections 1610 (a) (7) and 1610 (b) (2) of the FSIA). Plaintiffs then began to
bring actions against Iran before United States courts for damages arising from
deaths and injuries caused by acts allegedly supported, including financially, by
Iran....
23. In 2002, the United States adopted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act

(hereinafter the "TRIA"), which established

enforcement measures for

judgments entered following the 1996 amendment to the FSIA. In particular,
Section 201 of the TRIA provides as a general rule that, in every case in which a
person has obtained a judgment in respect of an act of terrorism or falling within
the scope of Section 1605 (a) (7) of the FSIA, the assets of a "terrorist party"
(defined to include, among others, designated "State sponsors of terrorism")

previously blocked by the United States Government-"including the blocked
assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party"-shall be subject
to execution or attachment in aid of execution.

Id. ¶¶ 20-23. It further notes that "the assets of Iran and Iranian State-owned entities, including
Bank Markazi, are now subject to enforcement proceedings in various cases in the United States
or abroad, or have already been distributed to judgment creditors." Id. ¶ 27.
183. Certain Iranian Assets, supranote 182, ¶ 20 (stating "The United States claims that Iran
is responsible for this bombing and for subsequent acts of terrorism and violations of international
law; Iran rejects these allegations.").
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Before the ICJ, the U.S. orally argued that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction
on different three grounds while Iran simply claimed the ICJ had
jurisdiction pursuant to the Treaty of Amity signed by the U.S. and Iran
in 1955.184 One of the grounds the U.S. argued lack of jurisdiction on was
that Iran's claims arose from Executive Order 13599,185 which Iran
viewed to be inconsistent with the obligations of the U.S. to Iran under
the Treaty of Amity.1 8 6 Specifically, Iran claimed "that, by failing to
184. Id. ¶¶ 17, 29. It is instructive to note that Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of
Amity provides the following: "Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the
interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall
be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to
settlement by some other pacific means." Id. ¶ 29; see also Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations,
and Consular Rights Between Iran and the United States of America, Iran-U.S., art. XXI, ¶ 2,
Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Treaty-ofAmity-Economic-Relations-and-Consular-Rights-between-the-United-States-of-America-andIran-Aug.-15-1955.pdf [https://perma.cc/HVN7-GW5Z] [hereinafter Treaty of Amity]. In
holding that it had jurisdiction, the ICJ notes that "Treaty of Amity was in force between the
Parties on the date of the filing of Iran's Application, namely 14 June 2016, and that the
denunciation of the Treaty announced by the United States on 3 October 2018 has no effect on
the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case." Certain Iranian Assets, supra note 182, ¶ 39. The
United States had argued that the Treaty of Amity would not apply to this case because "all claims
that U.S. measures that block the property and interests in property of the Government of Iran or
Iranian financial institutions (as defined in Executive Order 13599 and regulatory provisions
implementing Executive Order 13599) violate any provision of the Treaty." Id. 1 15. In its view,
these claims fell outside the scope of the Treaty by virtue of Article XX, paragraph 1,
subparagraphs (c) and (d), thereof, which, in part, provides that "[t]he present Treaty shall not
preclude the application of measures.., necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High Contracting
Party for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect
its essential security interests." Id. ¶ 39. But the ICJ held that it had jurisdiction because Treaty of
Amity contains no provision expressly excluding certain matters from its jurisdiction." Id. ¶ 45.
185. Certain Iranian Assets, supra note 182, at 5 (noting that the U.S.'s first objection to the
ICJ's jurisdiction was based on "Iran's claims arising from measures taken by United States to
block Iranian assets pursuant to Executive Order 13599."); see also id. ¶ 25. In 2012, the Obama
administration, with the authority vested in the president under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, and the National Defense Authorization
Act, among other laws, implemented Executive Order 13599, with the design to block the assets
of the Iranian government and other Iranian controlled or owned financial institutions, "in light
of the deceptive practices of the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks to conceal
transactions of sanctioned parties, the deficiencies in Iran's antimoney laundering regime and the
weaknesses in its implementation, and the continuing and unacceptable risk posed to the
international financial system by Iran's activities .... " Exec. Order No. 13599 of February 5,
2012, 77 Fed. Reg. 26, 6659 (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/02/
08/2012-3097/blocking-property-of-the-government-of-iran-and-iranian-financial-institutions
[https://perma.cc/GS2W-PG4Z].
186. Certain Iranian Assets, supra note 182, ¶ 13(b) (detailing a long list of acts Iran claimed
the United States committed, many of which are similar to the sanctions outlined in Executive
Order 13599, that Iran claimed were breaches of the obligations owed to it by the U.S.).
In rejecting the United States' first objection, the ICJ noted that the "Treaty of Amity was in
force between the Parties on the date of the filing of Iran's Application, namely 14 June 2016, and
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recognize the separate juridical status of Bank Markazi and other Iranian
companies, the United States has breached Article III, paragraph 1, of the
Treaty [of Amity]; that, by denying these various companies the
immunities that they would otherwise enjoy, it has breached Article III,
187
paragraph 2, and Article XI, paragraph 4, of the Treaty."
The United States also argued that the case was not admissible
because,
116. . . . Iran has come before it with "unclean
hands".... "Iran has sponsored and supported international
terrorism, as well as taken destabilizing actions in
contravention of nuclear non-proliferation, ballistic missile,
arms trafficking, and counter-terrorism obligations." It
contends that Iran is seeking relief because of the outcome
of the Peterson case, which, in its view, arose from Iran's
support for terrorism.
117. The United States recognizes that in the past the Court
has not upheld an objection based on the "clean hands"
doctrine, but argues that it has not rejected the doctrine
either, and that, in any event, the time is ripe for the Court to
acknowledge it and apply it. According to the United States,
the Court need not address the merits of this case to assess
the legal consequences of Iran's conduct. 188
However, the ICJ responded by stating that "the United States has not
argued that Iran, through its alleged conduct, has violated the Treaty of
Amity, upon which its Application is based"1 89 and that "[s]uch a
conclusion is however without prejudice to the question whether the
allegations made by the United States, concerning notably Iran's alleged
sponsoring and support of international terrorism and its presumed
that the denunciation of the Treaty announced by the United States on 3 October 2018 has no

effect on the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case." Id. 1 30. The United States had
previously argued that the Treaty of Amity would not apply to this case because "all claims that
U.S. measures that block the property and interests in property of the Government of Iran or
Iranian financial institutions (as defined in Executive Order 13599 and regulatory provisions
implementing Executive Order 13599) violate any provision of the Treaty". Id. ¶ 15. In the view

of the U.S., Iran's claims in this regard fell outside the scope of the Treaty of Amity by virtue of
Article XX, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (c) and (d), which, in part, provide that "[tlhe present
Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures... (d) necessary to fulfill the obligations of
a High Contracting Party for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security,
or necessary to protect its essential security interests." Id. ¶¶ 38, 39; see also Treaty of Amity,

supra note 184, art. XX, ¶ 1. However, the ICJ held that it had jurisdiction because the Treaty of
Amity contains no provision expressly excluding certain matters from its jurisdiction." Id. ¶¶ 45,
47.
187. Certain Iranian Assets, supra note 182,

¶

33.

188. Id.¶¶116-17.
189. Id. ¶ 122.
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actions in respect of nuclear non-proliferation and arms trafficking,
could, eventually, provide a defense on the merits."' 90 In spite of the ICJ
ruling, on January 13, 2020 the U.S. Supreme Court directed the Second
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to consider a new law enacted by the
government-the defense spending bill signed by the President in 2019that could give the families access to the funds.' 9
Following the lead of the U.S. Supreme court in recent decisions,
lower courts have summarily rejected Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claims on
the ground that the petitioners could not overcome the presumption
against extraterritorial application. Apart from the case of Al Shimari v.
CACI Premier Technology, Inc., 192 in which the court held that the
Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel did not foreclose the plaintiffs'
claims under the ATS because plaintiffs' claims did "touch and concern"
the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS,1 93 the
190. Id. ¶ 123.
191. Andrew Chung, U.S. Supreme Court Tosses Ruling That Revived Suit Against Iran
Central Bank REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2020, 9:55 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-courtiran/u-s-supreme-court-tosses-ruling-that-revived-suit-against-iran-central-bank-idUSKBN1 ZC
1II [https://perma.cc/S66B-YQ6L].

192. 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014). In this case, four Iraqi citizens brought action in the
Southern District of Ohio under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) against, inter alia, the military
contractor, CACI, alleging that the plaintiffs were abused and tortured during their detention at
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq as suspected enemy combatants. Id. at 520-21. The abuse and torture
were described in the opinion as follows:
Among many other examples of mistreatment, the plaintiffs described having
been "repeatedly beaten," "shot in the leg," "repeatedly shot in the head with a
taser gun," "subjected to mock execution," "threatened with unleashed dogs,"
"stripped naked," "kept in a cage," "beaten on [the] genitals with a stick,"
"forcibly subjected to sexual acts," and "forced to watch" the "rape[] [of] a
female detainee."

Id. at 521.
193. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech. Inc., 758 F.3d at 520. In this case, the court found
that the claims of the plaintiffs' reflected "extensive relevant conduct" on United States territory.
Id. at 528. The plaintiffs' allegations of torture were "committed by United States citizens who
were employed by an American corporation, CACI, which has corporate headquarters located in
Fairfax County, Virginia." Id. The court further found that the alleged torture "occurred at a
military facility operated by United States government personnel." Id; compare Sexual Minorities

Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 323 (D. Mass. 2013) (evaluating a claim for aiding and
abetting international law violations committed abroad and holding that the claims sufficiently
touched and concerned the United States because the "[a]mended Complaint adequately sets out
actionable conduct undertaken by Defendant in the United States to provide assistance" to the

primary tortfeasors), with Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 96-97 (D.D.C.
2014) (holding that plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaint to allege further facts
to display that their claims "sufficiently touch and concern" the U.S. in order to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality, and implying that general evidence in the record of
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194
majority of cases brought under the ATS have not been successful.
Courts have even rejected cases of torture allegedly committed by
95
U.S. agents invoking the presumption against extraterritoriality.1
Sometimes the U.S. courts have granted relief under the Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA) but, unfortunately, the TVPA does not grant
jurisdiction for an ATS claim.1 9 6 In all of these cases, the courts were
reluctant to accept the concept of universal jurisdiction, which is an
exception to extraterritoriality principle. That is the case, even though
many courts across the world 197 embrace the view that "a foreign court

management decisions being made in the United States was not enough to overcome this
presumption.).

194. See, e.g., Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 171 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that
allegations against the automobile manufacturer were insufficient to rebut presumption against

extraterritoriality); Doe v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(holding that the alleged torture in China lacked sufficient nexus with United States to overcome

presumption against extraterritorial application of ATS); Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576,
593 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that "[s]ince Plaintiffs' claims as alleged involve both domestic and
extraterritorial conduct, the presumption against extraterritoriality applies and will prevent

jurisdiction unless it is displaced."); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 95 (noting
prior cases that have held that "the presumption against extraterritoriality is not displaced by a

defendant's U.S. citizenship alone").
195. See, e.g., Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring) (stating that the court would dismiss the torture allegations arising the context of
the U.S. fight against terrorism, even if there was no alternative remedy, because "[t]he confluence
of . . . two factors-extraterritoriality and national security-renders this an especially
inappropriate case for a court to supplant Congress and the President by erecting new limits on

the U.S. war effort.").
196. See, e.g., Drummond Co., 782 F.3d at 583 ("In contrast to the ATS, which can confer
jurisdiction but does not include an independent cause of action, the TVPA provides a cause of

action but contains no jurisdictional grant."); Jara v. Nhflez, 878 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 2018)
(citing Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 593 (11th Cir. 2015) and noting that the district
court dismissed the plaintiff's Alien Tort Statute claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
however, plaintiffs ultimately won the jury trial on their claims under the Torture Victim

Protection Act [TVPA] and were awarded $28 million in damages. Plaintiffs appealed from the
dismissal order of their ATS claims, but the court affirmed the dismissal order as the TVPA grants
cause of action but not jurisdiction and the plaintiffs could only alleged extraterritorial conduct.).
197. Garth Meintjes & Juan E. Mendez, Reconciling Amnesties With UniversalJurisdiction,

2 INT'L L. F. DU DROIT INT'L 76, 78 (2000) (observing that the principle of universal jurisdiction
"has been reinforced by the creation of ad hoc war crimes tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, and reconfirmed by the adoption by the Rome Statute for an International Criminal
Court... In addition, the recent arrest of Pinochet in the United Kingdom ... has given greater
recognition to another form of universal jurisdiction: a state's extraterritorial competence to
prosecute international crimes committed in foreign countries."). Although the U.S. has
increasingly declined to extend the instances in which universal jurisdiction applies, there is

historical precedent for such application. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162
(1820) (noting "the general practice of all nations in punishing all persons, whether natives or
foreigners, who have committed this offense against any persons whatsoever."); Inst. of Cetacean

Rsch v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc'y, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1317 (W.D. Wash. 2015)
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may legitimately invoke universal jurisdiction to prosecute certain crimes
that were inadequately prosecuted at the domestic level."' 9 8 In doing so,
the international community is not completely oblivious to the principle
of extraterritoriality. Rather, the extraterritoriality principle is qualified
in order to enforce more transcendent international obligations. It is on
that basis that, historically, courts have ruled that "[u]niversal jurisdiction
over pirates applied to both civil and criminal proceedings."1 9 9
Following the U.S. withdrawing from the Iran Deal, as part of what
appeared to be the Trump administration's general retreat from
international deals, 2 00 the U.S. reimposed sanctions on Iran pursuant to
Executive Order 13846 dated August 6, 2018.201 Iran responded to the
reimposition of sanctions by suing the U.S. before the ICJ and submitting
a request for the indication of provisional measures. 2 02 Iran advanced the
argument that the "sanctions" imposed by the U.S. pursuant to Executive
Order 13846 of August 6, 2018,
which are to be applied in the event that any person provides
material assistance, sponsors, or provides financial, material
or technological support for, or goods or services in support
of, among others the National Iranian Oil Company and the
Central Bank of Iran after 5 November 2018, are
incompatible with the rights of Iran under Article IV,
paragraph 1 [of Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights Between Iran and the United States of
America (1955).]203

(holding that court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear ATS claim by environmental group

for illegal whaling).
198. Meintjes & Mendez, supra note 197, at 82.

199. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction'sHollow
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L L. J. 183, 192 (2004).
200. In exchange for sanctions on Iran, in 2015, "the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States), the European Union (EU), and Iran reached a Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively
peaceful." U.S. Dep't of State, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, https://20092017.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/index.html [https://perma.cc/S2EU-2E2C].

201. Exec. Order No. 13846 of August 6, 2018, Fed. Reg. 152,38939 (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/08/07/2018-17068/reimposing-certain-sanctions
-with-respect-to-iran [https://perma.cc/46BR-J9Y8].
202. Alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular

Rights, Iran v. U.S., Provisional Measures Order, 2018 I.C.J. Rep. 623, 1 1, 4 (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/175/175-20181003-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GC9V-P72H]. The ICJ defines "provisional measures" as "interim measures which can
be requested by the applicant State if it considers that the rights that form the subject of its
application are in immediate danger. " How the Court Works, INT'L CT. JUST., https://www.icjcij.org/en/how-the-court-works [https://perma.cc/7DH W-V7V7].

203. Id. 156.
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On October 4, 2018, the ICJ issued provisional measures under which it
ordered the United States to remove the sanctions that suppressed
humanitarian aid to Iran, including medical supplies, food, and civil
aviation safety, 204 observing that "there remains a risk that the measures
20 5
adopted by the United States ... may entail irreparable consequence."
The ICJ pretty much told the U.S. government that it would not
unilaterally and blatantly flout international obligations under the Treaty
of Amity. Because the Treaty of Amity was standing in the way of its
interests, the U.S. government subsequently withdrew from that treaty in
2018.206 Then on January 3, 2020, a drone strike ordered by the U.S.
government killed General Qasem Soleimani-the top commander of
204. Id. 170. The ICJ notes some of the history of this case as follows:
16. Starting in 2006, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a
number of resolutions (1696 (2006), 1737 (2007), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008),
1835 (2008) and 1929 (2010)), following reports by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (hereinafter "IAEA") which wcre critical of Iran's compliance
with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (ratified by Iran in 1970), calling upon Iran to cease some of its nuclear
activities. The Security Council also imposed sanctions in order to ensure

compliance. Various States imposed additional "sanctions" on Iran.
17. On 14 July 2015, China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the

United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the
European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Islamic
Republic of Iran, adopted a long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(hereinafter the "JCPOA" or the "Plan") concerning the nuclear programme of

Iran.....
20. On 8 May 2018, the President of the United States issued a National Security
Presidential Memorandum announcing the end of the participation of the United

States in the JCPOA and directing the reimposition of "sanctions lifted or waived
in connection with the JCPOA". In the Memorandum, the President of the United
States indicated that "Iranian or Iran-backed forces have gone on the march in
Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and continue to control parts of Lebanon and Gaza". He
further stated that Iran had publicly declared that it would deny the IAEA access

to military sites and that, in 2016, Iran had twice violated the JCPOA's heavywater stockpile limits. The Presidential Memorandum determined that it was in
the national interest of the United States to reimpose sanctions "as expeditiously

as possible", and "in no case later than 180 days" from the date of the
Memorandum.

¶ 16-17, 20.
205. Id. ¶92.
206. Edward Wong & David E. Sanger, U.S. Withdraws From 1955 Treaty Normalizing

Relations With Iran, N.Y TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/world/
middleeast/us-withdraws-treaty-iran.html [https://perma.cc/HPS9-Y4QT] (observing that the
"move came hours after the International Court of Justice ordered the United States to ensure that
a new round of American sanctions imposed against Tehran this year did not prevent food,
medicine and aircraft parts from reaching Iran").
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Iranian Revolutionary guards-as the U.S. claimed that Soleimani was
plotting an imminent, significant campaign of violence against the United
States. 207
When the ICJ looks at the same facts and norms and tends to rule in
ways that depart from positions adopted by the courts in the United
States, it may be worth asking whether the U.S. Supreme Court needs to
do more of what Justice Scalia urged it to do when considering positions
held in foreign and international courts.
We can, and should, look decisions of other signatories when
we interpret treaty provisions. Foreign constructions are
evidence of the original shared understanding of the
contracting parties.... even if we disagree, we surely owe
the conclusions reached by appellate courts of other
signatories the courtesy of respectful consideration.208
III. LOOKING TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT SUPPORTS UNITED
STATES INTERESTS

It is not enough to say that the U.S. is an important international actor
that needs to do more to engage international law when the United States
keeps insisting that its interests are not sufficiently protected. It is not just
the United States that needs international law, the rest of the international
community benefits from the full participation of the U.S. As a former
Secretary of State noted with regard to the U.S. national security strategy,
"American leadership isn't needed less, it's actually needed more. And
the simple fact is that no significant global change can be met without
[the United States]." 2 09 American leadership in the international arena is
needed and this should have nothing to do with which political party is in
charge in the United States, yet it does. 2 10

&

207. Jesse Yeung, Fernando Alfonso III, Tara John, Julia Hollingsworth, Rob Picheta
Mike Hayes, Iran's Top General Soleimani Killed in US Strike, CNN (Jan. 4, 2020, 4:26 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/baghdad-airport-strike-live-intl-hnk/h_361 5c6d58c

bd56d14338a9358dl d8900 [https://perma.cc/TZ2K-3QU3].
208. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660-61 (2004) (emphasis added).
209. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks on the Obama Administration's
National Security Strategy at the Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C. (May 27, 2010),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/201 0/05/14231 2.htm
[https://perma

.cc/4ELR-QU2X].
210. The world views of the United States under President Trump's republican
administration dipped drastically compared to that of his predecessor, President Obama's
democratic administration. Compare World Warming to US under Obama, BBC Poll Suggests,

BBC

NEWS

(Apr.

19,

2010,

1:16

GMT),

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8626041.stm

[https://perma.cc/G44M-TE76] (noting that "[f]or the first time since the annual poll began in
2005, America's influence in the world is now seen as more positive than negative," "[t]he
improved scores for the US coincided with Barack Obama becoming president." and "positive
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As U.S. President Obama acknowledged to the United Nations
General Assembly nine months after taking office:
I took office at a time when many around the world had come
to view America with skepticism and distrust.... Part of this
was due to opposition to specific policies, and a belief that
on certain critical issues, America has acted unilaterally,
without regard for the interests of others. And this has fed an
almost reflexive anti-Americanism, which too often has
served as an excuse for collective inaction. Now, like all of
you, my responsibility is to act in the interest of my nation
and my people, and I will never apologize for defending
those interests. But it is my deeply held belief that in the year
2009 -- more than at any point in human history -- the
211
interests of nations andpeoples are shared.
The President also said "[t]he world must stand together to demonstrate
that international law is not an empty promise, and that treaties will be
enforced." 2 12 Indeed, despite the whipsaw created by the revolving U.S.
administrations every 4 to 8 years controlled by different political parties
with vastly different views, the global poll seems to indicate that "people
haven't necessarily given up on the U.S.... that they still want the U.S.
2 13
to play a leadership role on the international stage."

views of the US fell to a low of 28% on average in 2007, from 38% in 2005, but recovered to 35%
in 2009 and 40% in [the 2010] poll.") with Sharp drop in world views of US, UK: Global poll for
BBC World Service, BBC, BBC MEDIA CENTRE (July 3, 2017), https://www.bbc.co.uk/
mediacentre/latestnews/2017/globescan-poll-world-views-world-service

[https://perma.cc/8AKF

-XQHR] (noting "[n]egative views of US influence in the world have increased in the majority of
countries surveyed," "double-digit increases in negative views of the US, rising to majorities, are

now found in several of its NATO allies," and "positive views have dropped by five points to
about a third (34%). The US showed the most substantial decline in ratings out of all the countries
polled this year.") and Global perception of US falls to two-decade low, BBC NEWS (Sept. 15,
[https://perma.cc/G8T8-3RJ5]
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54169732
[hereinafter Global Perception] (noting that "[t]hough favourable views of the US has been falling
in recent years, in 2020, the perceptions in several countries were the lowest Pew had seen since
it began polling," "[t]he majority of the public in every country surveyed did not have confidence
in Mr. Trump," and that "[t]he results of the survey come as long-term questions swirl over

America's leadership on the global stage, and as the country continues to battle coronavirus. The
US has recorded over 6m cases and nearly 200,000 deaths due to Covid-19. Dr Richard Wike, a
director of the Pew survey, said: 'What we've seen in our polling over the past few years is that
many people around the world see the US stepping away from a leadership position in world
affairs, and that's had a negative impact on what they think of the country."').
211. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks By The President To The United Nations

General Assembly at the United Nations Headquarters, New York, New York (Sept. 23, 2009),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-united-nations-general

-assembly [https://perma.cc/XV3F-NZV8] (Emphasis added).
212. Id.
213. Global Perception, supra note 210.
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With that said, there is still a legitimate question as to what can be
done, if anything, to ensure that international law is more supportive of
interests of the United States. International Law already provides for
accommodations especially with regard to the reservations and
understandings clauses of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. 2 14 International law also defers to the domestic legal system
with respect to each country's involvement in international law. Some
countries adopt a monistic system, while others adopt a dualist system.
Indeed, some other countries adopt a hybrid system, which allows for the
so-called self-executing treaties. 21 5
The Constitution of the United States of America provides that the
President shall have the power, "by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur." 2 16 Under United States law, however, there is a distinction made
between the terms "treaty" and "executive agreement." In the United
States, the word treaty is reserved for an agreement that is made "by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." 2 17 International agreements
that are not submitted to the Senate for ratification are known as executive
agreements. 2 18 "Generally, a treaty is a binding international agreement
and an executive agreement applies in domestic law only." 219 States have
the right to join treaties, withdraw from treaties, or terminate their treaty
obligations as long as they do it according to the provisions of the
pertinent law. 220 Consistent with those rights, "the United States has
214. VCLT, supra note 4, arts. 2(1)(d), 19-23. Most of these provisions are regarded as part
of customary international law. See Case Concerning the Gab6ikovo-Nagymaros Project

(Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 3,
215. See MARK W. JANS & JOHN E. NOYES,,

¶ 42-46 (Sept. 25, 1997).
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY

226-28 (6th ed. 2020)(explaining that under dualism, "international law and municipal law" are
seen as separate and discrete legal systems.") Under dualism, international treaties must be ratified
in accordance with municipal procedures to become binding. In countries with monistic
procedures, international law and municipal law are seen as parts of an integrated legal system
with the result that there is no need for ratification for international treaties to become legally
binding. In some countries, such as the United States, courts give effect to some international
treaties without any need for ratification-even though a dualistic system is generally followedif those treaties were intended to have that effect under domestic law.
216. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
217. Treaty vs. Executive Agreement, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE: TREATY AFFAIRS FAQ,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/s//treaty/faqs/70133.htm [https://perma.cc/E2YB-23BS] (last visited
May 12, 2021).

218. Id
219. Marci Hoffman, Researching U.S. Treaties and Agreements, LLRX: LAW AND TECH.
RES. FOR LEGAL PROS. (2001), https://www.llrx.com/2001 /05/features-researching-u-s-treatiesand-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/UG5N-NUHE].
220. VCLT, supra note 4, art. 54 ("The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party
may take place: in conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or at any time by consent of all
the parties after consultation with the other contracting States."); see also id art. 56(2) ("[A] party
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refused to join ... the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts
(2000),"221 and renounced the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement
on Climate Change.
Sometimes the U.S. not becoming a party to a treaty has to do with
the fact that the Senate's consent cannot be secured. For example, when
the U.S. signed an international treaty with Russia regarding Nuclear
Weapons, 22 the government had to face a Congress which was not
filibuster-proof, where these actions were viewed as weakening the
security of the United States. 2 2 3 Yet this was an issue on which both
political parties could have found common ground. For example, the idea
of limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially if they got into
the hands of terrorists, would be appealing to those who have high
security concerns. 22 ' Also, it would mean that a treaty such as the New
START would have to guarantee that the security of the United States

shall give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to denounce or withdraw from a
treaty under paragraph 1."); see also Paris Agreement, supra note 79, art. 28 (providing for the
process for withdrawing from the treaty); see also U.S. CONST. art. I[, § 2 (arguing that whereas

the U.S. Constitution provides that the President has the power to make treaties with the "advice
and consent" of Congress, it is important to note that from a domestic standpoint, the Constitution
is silent with regard to the issue of whether the President "must" seek the consent of Congress);

see also Goldwater v. Carter,617 F.2d 697, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that the president had
the authority to terminate a treaty with Taiwan without first obtaining the advice and consent of
the Senate). However, the circuit court opinion in Goldwater v. Carterwas later vacated by the
U.S. Supreme Court and remanded to the lower court for dismissal without an official opinion

being issued addressing the question, two justices stating in separate concurring opinions that the
issue was either not ripe for judicial review or was a nonjusticiable political question that could

not be addressed by the Court. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996, 998 (1979).
221. Rudiger Wolfrum, Reflections on the Development of InternationalTreaty Law under

the Auspices of the United States Hegemony and Globalization, 8 AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L & EuR.
L. 229, 229 (2003).
222. Peter Baker & Dan Bilefsky, Russia and U.S. Sign Nuclear Arms Reduction Pact, N.Y.
9, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/world/europe/09prexy.html
TimES (Apr.

[https://perma.cc/5R5E-4K5M] (reporting that under the NEW START treaty, if ratified, each
side within seven years would be barred from deploying more than 1,550 strategic warheads or

700 launchers).
223. See Ed Hornick, U.S.-Russia Arms Treaty To Face GOP Scrutiny in Senate, CNN

PoLrrics (Apr. 9, 2010, 10:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLlTICS/04/08/start.treaty.
senate/index.html?iref--allsearch [https://perma.ce/75ME-3ZZ8] (providing that U.S. Senator
Mitch McConnell responded to the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by announcing that

"[t]he Senate will assess whether or not the agreement is verifiable, whether it reduces our
Nation's ability to defend itself and our allies from the threat of nuclear armed missiles, and
whether or not this administration is committed to preserving our own nuclear triad.").
224. See David E. Sanger, Obama Vows Fresh ProliferationPush as Summit Ends, N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/14/world/14summit.html
2010),
13,
(Apr.
TimEs

[https://perma.cc/6ZL5-G3WH].
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could be maintained. This is the way to proceed with treaties and to get
the consent of the Senate. 2 2 5
If the U.S. Senate is suspicious of international treaties, this suspicion
may extend to how international courts are viewed in the U.S. There
could be legitimate reasons for the United States being suspicious of
international courts on the assumption that international judges could
"gang up" against the United States using international law as a pretext.
It is for this reason that the International Court of Justice established the
chambers procedure so that states can choose judges that it believes
would render impartial justice. 226 But that is only one instance in which
the interests of the United States can be assured. There is more that needs
to be done to give confidence to the United States that its interests are not
necessarily frustrated under the guise of "neutral" application of
international law.
Treaties should provide to states that are parties to the treaty the
opportunity to have bilateral treaties that provide protection to nonparticipating (third) states. For example, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court provides that a third state's consent must be
requested before the sending state surrenders a person belonging to the
third state to the International Criminal Court (ICC). 22 7 To take advantage
of this provision, the United States has taken every step necessary to
ensure that ICC jurisdiction does not extend to United States citizens by
entering into bilateral immunity agreements with state parties to the
Rome Statute. The U.S. government at one time even blacklisted states
that were involved in the ICC, including those who shared the democratic
ideals of the United States. 2 2 8
For example, the United States government went so far as to veto a
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia in 2002 because it was unable to secure
similar immunity provisions in the authorizing Security Council

225. See Hornick, supra note 223 ("Senate GOP leadership reportedly said that 'as long as
the administration can satisfactorily answer questions about verification, missile defense and the
modernization of the existing U.S. stockpile, Republicans will likely support the new treaty."').
226. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 26(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 ("The Court may at any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular case. The
number ofjudges to constitute such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the approval
of the parties.").
227. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 98, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, 148, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1998/07/19980717%2006-33%20PM/volume-2187-

1-38544-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4ZU-SXMW].
228. Elise Keppler, The United States and the International Criminal Court: The Bush
Administration's Approach and A Way Forward Under the Obama Administration, HUM. RTs.
WATCH (Aug. 2, 2009, 8:45 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/02/united-states-andinternational-criminal-court-bush-administrations-approach-and-way
[https://perma.cc/8EJY-

BJSG].
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Resolution. 2 2 9 In spite of that, the Rome Statute could go further by
endorsing the validity of those bilateral immunity agreements. This has
the potential of changing U.S. attitude towards the ICC.
The United States has already shown signs that it can change its
attitude towards the ICC because it did not reject a major decision of the
U.N. Security Council concerning referral of the situation in Darfur,
Sudan, to the ICC. 230 By allowing this to happen, the United States
recognized the ICC as a -legitimate organization capable of ensuring
security and justice for serious offenses against humanity within the
international community. 23 ' But that does not mean that the U.S. fully
embraces the ICC.
Another area of concern is the role of international organizations,
particularly the United Nations and its agencies. The United States
sometimes maintains that these organizations receive a lot of financial
support from the United States and other countries do not contribute their
fair share of the financial burden. It is also no accident that globalizing
forces are at the center of the renewed debate about international law.
Whether in terms of liberalized trade, strengthened human rights rules, or
enhanced environmental protections, or the clout of international
organizations, so much of the debate about the proper role of international
regimes is really an exercise at shadow boxing between the proponents
and critics of certain, distinct forms of globalization.
The most credible of the critiques of the globalization is the combined
concerns of the transparency, accountability, and overall legitimacy of
international lawmaking processes. It has been observed that
place new stresses on our
"[g]lobalization and its attendant effects ...
domestic constitutional and political system. Novel forms of international
cooperation increasingly call for the transfer of rulemaking authority to
international organizations that lack American openness and
accountability." 2 3 According to this view of globalization, the inevitable
concentration of power in international institutions, far removed from
mechanisms of popular democracy, makes much international law
illegitimate.
While there are no easy answers to these issues, it is important that the
United Nations tries to engage the legitimate concerns about lack of
accountability and globalization at the national level. As more countries
229. Colum Lynch, Dispute Threatens U.N. Role in Bosnia, WASH. POST (July 1, 2002),
https://www.washingtonpostcom/archive/politics/2002/07/01 /dispute-threatens-un-role-in-bosnia

/126b405f-6f58-4d7a-9dcc-6bd1715155d1/ [https://perma.cc/8PTS-7LVG]; see also U.S. Veto
1, 2002, 8:00 PM),
Betrays. the Bosnian People, HUM. RTs. WATCH (July
hUps://www.hrw.org/news/2002/07/01/us-veto-betrays-bosnian-people

89E5].
230. See S.C. Res. 1593,

[https://perma.cc/8DNR-

¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2005).

231. Keppler, supra note 228.

232. John C. Yoo, UN Wars, U.S. Powers, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 355, 361 (2000).
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such as China, Germany, and Japan, grow in economic prowess, they
should begin to contribute in proportion to their gross domestic product.
Just like with the European Union, the United Nations may have, at some
point, to consider having elected representatives to increase
accountability. These changes are not likely to happen, however, until
reforms have been made to the Charter of the United Nations.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

It has been proposed that the "United States-and other like-minded
states-should choose engagement over unilateralism. When faced with
a foreign policy problem, the United States should not proceed alone but
rather seek to engage with other countries and adversaries around
common values, in search of diplomatic solutions that can be embedded
within durable international law principles." 233 But the withdrawal from
international treaties signals that the United States is ready and willing to
go it alone, if necessary. This withdrawal is not without its costs.
Withdrawal from a treaty should be a tool of last resort. Just like it is
difficult to ratify a treaty, it should be equally hard to exit an international
treaty. It is permissible to withdraw from a treaty; 23 4 it is just so much
harder to rejoin the treaty. In the meantime, the United States would have
to sit out, isolated, and incapable of directly influencing important
decisions. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for
accession to a treaty, but it does not provide a mechanism for rejoining
and the only opportunity to change. course is to revoke a withdrawal
instrument before it takes effect. 2 35
The issue is whether the interests of the country that is withdrawing
are best served by staying and trying to improve the treaty, rather than
wholesale withdrawal, even with a promise of rejoining at a later stage
after changes that the U.S. agrees with have been made. 23 6 It appears that
233. Koh, supra note 9, at 417.
234. VCLT, supra note 4, art. 54(a) ("The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party
may take place in conformity with the provisions of the treaty .... ").
235. Id. art. 68 ("A notification or instrument provided for in article 65 or 67 may be revoked
at any time before it takes effect.").
236. See Chris Riotta, Trump Asks Lindsey Graham to Help Make New Iran Nuclear Deal,
Reports Say, THE INDEP. (Aug. 1, 2019, 3:25 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
americas/us-politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-lindsey-graham-middle-east-latest-a9033291.html
[https://perma.cc/2M98-T2BE] (arguing that there are several instances where the approach by
the U.S. government has been to push first for the tearing up of a treaty in the hope that it will be
rebuilt later; for example, with regard to the Iran Nuclear Deal, the U.S. withdrew and then sought
to promote the adoption of new deal, even as the U.S. imposed sanctions on Iran's Foreign
Minister, essentially cutting him off from meaningful diplomatic involvement, which followed
the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran on November 5, 2018); see also Jennifer Hansler & Betsy

Klein, US Sanctions Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif, CNN (July 31, 2019, 6:12 PM),
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it is easier and more constructive to make changes by staying engaged as
2 37
Rejoining a treaty
opposed to trying to effect change from without.
after a country has exited that treaty is fraught with uncertainties,
including the possibility that the government may need to seek fresh
Senate advice and consent, unless it is assumed that the original advice
2 38
and consent of the Senate applies to the rejoining process as well.
Moreover, if the government needs to seek the advice and consent of the
Senate in order to rejoin a treaty, there is no guarantee that such consent
would be obtained the next round. 239 Even if such consent is given, it may
take a very long time to get.240 In addition, rejoining a treaty presupposes
that the rejoining state has to go through the formalities of accession to
24
the treaty as if it had never belonged to the treaty. 1
The U.S. Congress should adopt legislation to curb the powers of the
government from exiting international treaties, particularly those that
24 2
were ratified by Congress, where the Congress has expressed its will.
[https://perma.cc/N8A7https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/31/politics/zarif-sanctions/index.html
MEAQ]; see also Iran Sanctions, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/programs/pages/iran.aspx [https://perma.cc/W6PS-5XBV] (last visited on Aug.

1, 2019).
237. See Koh, supra note 9, at 442 (noting that withdrawal leads to loss of leverage).
238. Jean Galbraith, Rejoining Treaties, 106 VA. L. REv. 73, 78 (2020) (arguing that it is
possible to "treat the Senate's pre-existing resolution of advice and consent as still operative.").

239. See id. at 77 ("[G]etting treaties through the Senate has always been challenging and is
now even harder than it used to be, due both to increased partisanship and to changed procedural

norms.").
240. See id. at 83-84 (providing examples of treaties that took a long time for the U.S. Senate
to provide the requisite advice and consent).
241. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "[fjor each State ratifying
or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or
accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of
its instrument of ratification or accession." VCLT, supra note 4, art. 84(2). It also provides that
termination of a treaty with respect to a state party to the treaty "[r]eleases the parties from any
obligation further to perform the treaty .... " Id. art. 70.
242. See Amirfar & Singh, supra note 47, at 445 (observing in connection with Justice
Jackson's tripartite analytical framework in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952), that the President's power to withdraw unilaterally from international agreements is
at its height where the withdrawal relates primarily to the exercise of the Executive branch's
exclusive Article 11 powers, such as the power to recognize foreign nations, but "the power of
unilateral withdrawal is at its nadir where the treaty relates to matters within the constitutional
authority of Congress, such as the power to regulate foreign commerce, and the withdrawal is not
supported by the express or implied will of Congress." The tripartite formula in Youngstown

provides that: (1) "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right
plus all that Congress can delegate;" (2) "[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which

its distribution is uncertain;" and (3) "[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the
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The U.S. Constitution does not provide that termination of international
obligations must be with the advice and consent of congress, but nor does
it prohibit the U.S. Congress from making such a requirement. 243 It seems
logical that if a treaty was entered into with the advice and consent of
Congress-an act that signifies that the Congress views the treaty to be
in national interest-that exiting such a treaty should also be with the
advice and consent of the U.S. Congress. Such legislation should provide
that the government can exit sole-executive agreements (after all those
are made without the advice and consent of the U.S. Congress) but not
treaties and congressional-executive agreements made with the advice
and consent of the U.S. Congress.244
Regarding the significance of making treaties and delegation of the
power to make treaties, one of the framers of the U.S. Constitution, John
Jay, wrote: "[t]he power of making treaties is an important one ... and it
should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with such
precautions ... that it will be exercised ... in the manner most conducive
to the public good." 2 45 If the power of "advice and consent" is aimed at
ensuring that the making of treaties is for the public good, so should the
unmaking of those treaties. John Jay further wrote that the "President and
Senators .. . will always be ... those who best understand our national
interests .. . who are best able to promote those interests .... With such
men the power of making treaties may be safely lodged." 246 Because
treaties take a long time and they are usually made in the national interest,
they should not be so quickly terminated. In this connection, John Jay
wrote:
It was wise, therefore, in the convention to provide, not only
that the power of making treaties should be committed to
able and honest men, but also that they should continue in
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at his lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter.").
243. The U.S. Constitution provides for congressional power and control over treaty-making.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. In Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1979) the court
held that the president had the authority to terminate a treaty with Taiwan without first obtaining
the advice and consent of the Senate. However, the circuit court opinion in Goldwater v. Carter
was later vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court and remanded to the lower court for dismissal
without an official opinion being issued addressing the question, two justices stating in separate
concurring opinions that the issue was either not ripe for judicial review or was a nonjusticiable
political question that could not be addressed by the Court. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,

996, 998 (1979).
244. There are three types of executive agreements: sole-executive, congressional-executive,
and treaty-based executive agreements. Sole-executive "agreements with no congressional
authorization or approval . . . rest on the President's independent constitutional authority in the

realm of foreign affairs." Amirfar & Singh, supra note 47, at 448.
245. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay).
246. id.
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place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted with
our national concerns, and to form and introduce a system
for the management of them. 2 4 7
Indeed, it does not seem that at the time the U.S. Constitution was
framed, it was envisioned that treaties could be so easily repealed. In this
regard, John Jay wrote:
Others, though content that treaties should be made in the
mode proposed, are averse to their being the SUPREME
laws of the land. They insist, and profess to believe, that
treaties like acts of assembly, should be repealable at
pleasure. This idea seems to be new and peculiar to this
country, but new errors, as well as new truths, often appear.
These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only
another name for a bargain, an that it would be impossible to
find a nation who would make any bargain with us, which
should be binding on them ABSOLUTELY, but on us only
so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it.
They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal
them; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties
may alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget that
treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting parties,
but by both; and consequently, that as the consent of both
was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever
8
afterwards be to alter or cancel them. 2 4
The U.S. Constitution does not permit the government the powers to
arrogate to itself the ability to unilaterally terminate treaties whose
formation had the seal of the U.S. Congress without the co-equal
participation of the U.S. Congress. On this matter, one of the United
States' founding fathers, Alexander Hamilton, had this to say:
The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws, or,
in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of the
society; while the execution of the laws, and the employment
of the common strength, either for this purpose or for the
common defense, seem to comprise all the functions of the
executive magistrate. The power of making treaties is,
plainly, neither the one nor the other. It relates neither to the
execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new
ones; and still less to an exertion of the common strength. Its
objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have
the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good
faith. They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the
subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct
department, and to belong, properly, neither to the
legislative nor to the executive. The qualities elsewhere
detailed as indispensable in the management of foreign
negotiations, point out the Executive as the most fit agent in
those transactions; while the vast importance of the trust, and
the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the
participation of the whole or aportion of the legislative body
in the office of making them. 2 9
If the U.S. government were able to act alone in the formation, and by
extension the termination of treaties, the security of such treaties would
be on precarious grounds. Alexander Hamilton spoke to this point by
writing:
To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the
Senate alone, would have been to relinquish the benefits of
the constitutional agency of the President in the conduct of
foreign negotiations ... . While the Union would, from this
cause, lose a considerable advantage in the management of
its external concerns, the people would lose the additional
security which would result from the co-operation of the
Executive. Though it would be imprudent to confide in him
solely so important a trust, yet it cannot be doubted that his
participation would materially add to the safety of the
society. It must indeed be clear to a demonstration that the
joint possession of the power in question, by the President
and Senate, would afford a greaterprospect of security, than
the separatepossession of it by either of them. And whoever
has maturely weighed the circumstances which must concur
in the appointment of a President, will be satisfied that the
office will always bid fair to be filled by men of such
characters as to render their concurrence in the formation of
treaties peculiarly desirable, as well on the score of wisdom,
as on that of integrity."s
Thomas Jefferson opined, "[t]reaties being declared, equally with the
laws of the United States, to be the supreme law of the land, it is
understood that an act of the legislature alone can declare them infringed
and rescinded." 25 1 Although that statement seems absolute, history
indicates that Congress has been willing to allow certain exceptions under
which the government could act unilaterally in terminating certain
treaties. For example, the U.S. Senate has previously considered, without
249. THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).

250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A
UNITED STATES SENATE

MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: FOR THE USE OF THE

I I 1 (1866).
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adopting, resolutions, "providing for unilateral termination without the
concurrence of Congress under certain circumstances, such as where the
treaty was superseded by statute,"2 52 or more generally when the
2 53
termination would not "endanger the security of the United States."
In addition, even without adopting legislation that requires express
concurrence of the U.S. Senate in termination of a treaty of the U.S., when
ratifying a treaty, the U.S. Senate could indicate that the treaty cannot be
terminated without the concurrence of the Senate. U.S. courts tend to
disapprove of executive agreements that were entered into contrary to the
will of Congress. For example, in United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.,254
the court declared a sole executive void and unenforceable "because it
was not authorized by Congress and contravened provisions of a statute
25 5
Similarly, a court
dealing with the very matter to which it related."
contrary to the
treaty
a
could declare invalid any attempt to terminate
expressed will of the U.S. Senate. Indeed, the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law provides that:
If the United States Senate, in giving consent to a treaty,
declares that it does so on condition that the President shall
not terminate the treaty without the consent of Congress or
of the Senate, or that he shall do so only in accordance with
some other procedure, that condition presumably would be
binding on the President if he proceeded to make the
treaty.
The disadvantage of this approach is that the U.S. Senate would have to
indicate in each ratified treaty whether it requires the concurrence of
Congress for that particular treaty to be terminated.
As far as the courts are concerned in their general approach to
international law, the United States Supreme Court needs to take a
position that consistently supports international law. As Professor Jack
Goldsmith notes, the Supreme Court has a "general (though not
257 That
inevitable) aversion to the incorporation of international law."
need not be the case. Specifically, in holding governments accountable,
the U.S. courts have the power to determine that the government cannot
25 8
It might not be a radical
unilaterally terminate international treaties.
252.

Amirfar & Singh, supra note 47, at 454.

253. Id.
254. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
255. Id. at 658.
256.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW

§ 339 cmt.

a (AM. LAW. INST.

1987).
257. Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 410.
258. Galbraith, supra note 3, at 448 ("U.S. courts hold the keys to new limits on presidential
power with respect to constitutional law and to the interpretation of implementing legislation. As
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step for the courts to take. After all, the U.S. Supreme Court may have
laid the ground in Clinton v. City ofNew York, where the Court held that
executive withdrawal from a treaty does not necessarily imply the
termination of implementing legislation of a treaty that is rooted in the
U.S. Constitution. 59
Beyond those recommendations, it is necessary also to ask what
international law can do to ensure that it responds to the concerns of the
United States. International institutions like the United Nations and its
agencies need to find creative ways to resolve those concerns. For
example, the United Nations may need to ensure that countries contribute
more to an organization in proportion to their respective gross domestic
product.
International courts need to ensure that justice is not just done but is
seen to be done when it relates to the United States. The Statute of the
International Court of Justice need not provide that parties can decide the
judges will sit in judgment over a matter affecting them, but only with the
consent of the ICJ. That consent may not be necessary as long as the
parties have agreed as to the judges.
It may be necessary also for the United Nations to establish a
mechanism for the continuing review of international agreements to
ensure that they are not rendered obsolete and non-responsive to
emerging issues, some of which have been raised by the United States.
In conclusion, the withdrawal of the United States may have a point
in that there could be legitimate concerns as to whether the interests of
the United States are not being met under various international treaties
and platforms. Even then, withdrawal itself seems to be too blunt an
instrument that may be wreaking havoc by painting international law with
a broad brush that may have long-term negative impacts on the very
interests that the United States is seeking to protect. This is because there
is a real possibility that the United States will simply end up isolating
itself. It may be easier to try to stay and bring change from within, rather
than try to change international law from the outside looking in because
of lack of standing. The United States, as the only superpower, has a lot
of leverage that it can rely on to bring about change while working from
the inside. U.S. courts need to be more protective of international law just
as international law needs to be more protective of U.S. interests.

examplen in the constitutional domain, the Supreme Court could one day hold that .
President lacks the power to terminate treaties .... ").

.

. the

259. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
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